The Language of Neutrality in Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings by Shapiro, Carolyn
Volume 122
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review
Winter 2018
The Language of Neutrality in Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearings
Carolyn Shapiro
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal
Profession Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dickinson
Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carolyn Shapiro, The Language of Neutrality in Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 122 Dick. L. Rev. 585 (2018).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr/vol122/iss2/5
The Language of Neutrality in Supreme
Court Confirmation Hearings
Carolyn Shapiro*
ABSTRACT
At Justice Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, then-Judge
Gorsuch repeatedly insisted that judging involves no more than
examining the legal materials—like statutes and precedents—
and applying them to the facts of the case.  There is, he empha-
sized, no room for a Justice’s “personal views,” and he refused
even to state his agreement (or disagreement) with such iconic
cases as Loving v. Virginia and Griswold v. Connecticut.  Instead,
then Judge Gorsuch reiterated only that they were precedents of
the Court and thus entitled to respect.  Frustrating as his answers
may have been to some senators, however, they differed from
answers given by other recent nominees largely in degree and
tone, not in kind.  Indeed, all four most recent nominees before
Gorsuch—but especially Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Sotomayor—made similar claims, of which Roberts’s invocation
of the neutral umpire is only the most famous.
Such forceful claims of neutrality and their attendant impli-
cation that there are necessarily right and wrong answers to diffi-
cult legal questions—answers that can be determined through
deductive reasoning or by examining legal texts through the right
lens—are not new, but their role and prominence in Supreme
Court confirmation hearings have changed over the years.  Using
both qualitative and quantitative analysis, including empirical re-
search on confirmation hearings already reported, this Article
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charts the history of such discussions in Supreme Court confirma-
tion hearings from Justice Harlan’s hearing in 1955 through Jus-
tice Gorsuch’s hearing in 2017—the period of time during which
all nominees have been expected to appear before the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee.  More specifically, the Article focuses on the
extent to which nominees and Senators have claimed that there
are objectively correct answers to the hard questions faced by the
Supreme Court or, alternatively, have acknowledged and dis-
cussed the reality that textual and historical sources often do not
provide clear answers and that Supreme Court Justices must bal-
ance competing interests, precedents, and constitutional princi-
ples and apply constitutional provisions and doctrines in new and
complex factual circumstances.
Specifically, the Article establishes that during the Warren
court years, claims of objectivity were often made by conserva-
tive senators, with relatively little discussion of alternative views
of judging by either senators or nominees.  By the late 1980s and
1990s, however, senators and nominees were having surprisingly
candid conversations about the role of the Supreme Court, con-
versations that acknowledged the importance of judgment and
judicial philosophy in resolving many difficult constitutional
questions.  Since 2000, however, nominees have largely eschewed
such discussions and, along with Republican senators, have em-
braced claims of objectivity and neutrality.
As the Article demonstrates, however, such claims about the
Court and its work are highly inaccurate, and they may have neg-
ative effects on the legitimacy of the Court as an institution.  Af-
ter all, when the Court announces its decisions in difficult cases,
members of the public can plainly see that different Justices both
approach those cases differently and often disagree about the re-
sult in predictable ways.  News media regularly refer to the “lib-
eral” and “conservative” Justices.  So there is a significant
disconnect between the claims made during confirmation hear-
ings and the actions the Justices take—and research suggests that
such a disconnect can undermine public confidence in the institu-
tion.  The Article closes by proposing that senators use their
questions during confirmation hearings to combat the myth that
judging, especially on the Supreme Court, is necessarily about
reaching objectively correct, logically deducible conclusions.
INTRODUCTION
The confirmation hearing for Judge Neil Gorsuch’s nomination
to the Supreme Court came at an awkward time.  President Donald
Trump announced Gorsuch’s nomination shortly after he issued an
Executive Order suspending the entry into the country of refugees
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and of people from seven majority-Muslim countries.1  Immedi-
ately, federal courts began to evaluate—and rule against—the Or-
der.2  In response to a federal district court in Seattle imposing a
nationwide Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the President
tweeted a complaint about the “so-called judge,”3 expressed shock
that the judge had “put our country in such peril,”4 and urged the
American people to blame the judge “and the courts” if “something
happens.”5  Around the same time, Trump-staffer Stephen Miller
appeared on a series of Sunday morning talk shows to argue, in
direct contradiction to the venerable precedent of Marbury v.
Madison,6 that “[w]e do not have judicial supremacy in this coun-
try.”7  And only days before the hearing began, a district court
judge in Hawaii issued a nationwide TRO against Trump’s new ver-
sion of the Executive Order.8
1. Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8693 (Jan. 30, 2017); Press Release,
Office of Press Sec’y, The White House, President Trump’s Nominee to the Su-
preme Court Neil M. Gorsuch (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/nomi-
nee-gorsuch.
2. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Lori Aratani, & Justin Jouvenal, Federal Judge
Temporarily Blocks Trump’s Entry Order Nationwide, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-judge-temporari
ly-blocks-trumps-immigration-order-nationwide/2017/02/03/9b734e1c-ea54-11e6-bf
6f-301b6b443624_story.html?utm_term=.310c9703f3f8.
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976?ref_src=twsrc%
5Etfw.
4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800.
5. Id.; see also, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4
(2017, 4:48 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828042506851934209
(accusing the judge of “open[ing] up our country to potential terrorists”).
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
7. Matthew Rozsa, Stephen Miller Goes Kellyanne Conway: Trump Adviser
Blasted for Dishonesty on Sunday Morning Shows, SALON (Feb. 13, 2017, 8:40
AM), http://www.salon.com/2017 /02 /13 / stephen-miller-goes-kellyanne-conway-
trump-adviser-blasted-for-dishonesty-on-sunday-morning-shows/ (reporting
Miller’s remarks on Fox News Sunday). See also Aaron Blake, Stephen Miller’s
Authoritarian Declaration: Trump’s National Security Actions ‘Will Not Be Ques-
tioned’, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/13/stephen-millers-audacious-controversial-declaration-
trumps-national-security-actions-will-not-be-questioned/?utm_term=.2fcc4c684e87
(reporting Miller’s assertion that the President’s national security decisions “will
not be questioned”); Jonathan Swan, Best of Stephen Miller on the Sunday Shows,
AXIOS (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.axios.com/best-of-stephen-miller-on-the-sun-
day-shows-2257221562.html (reporting Miller’s statement on CBS’s Face the Na-
tion that “we have a judiciary that has taken far too much power and become in
many cases a supreme branch of government”).
8. Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, State of Hawai’i
v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) , available at https://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-0004-0032.pdf.
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Unsurprisingly under these circumstances, at Judge Gorsuch’s
confirmation hearing, Democratic Senators asked him about judi-
cial independence and supremacy, executive authority, and separa-
tion of powers.  Equally unsurprisingly, Gorsuch was adamant
about his independence as a judge.9  Although he refused to discuss
any specific comments made by the President or his staffers, he reit-
erated a statement he had reportedly made privately to Senator
Richard Blumenthal that disparaging comments about federal
judges were “disheartening” and “demoralizing.”10  But—also un-
surprisingly—he shared no substantive views about the scope of ex-
ecutive authority or separation of powers, even when pressed.
Such opacity is to be expected.  Indeed, conventional wisdom
agrees with Elena Kagan, who—long before she herself was nomi-
nated to the Court—called the post-Bork confirmation hearings “a
vapid and hollow charade.”11  As Senator and then-Senate Judici-
ary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter put it, the hearing is a
“subtle minuet” in which “nominees answer about as many ques-
tions as they think they have to in order to get confirmed.”12  And
while much of the criticism is aimed at the nominees, senators
themselves are not immune.  Observers accuse them of grandstand-
ing for the TV cameras,13 and the entire confirmation process is
viewed by many as overly politicized.14
Despite this conventional wisdom, recent scholarship has
demonstrated both that the hearings have long involved discussion
9. At one point, for example, then-Judge Gorsuch asserted bluntly, “I am my
own man” in response to Senator Al Franken’s questions about White House
Chief of Staff Reince Preibus’s assurances to conservative activists about what
kind of Justice Gorsuch would be. Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to be Associate
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. (2017), 3/21/2017 Fed. News Serv. Transcripts, 2017 WLNR 8821289,
at 107 [hereinafter Gorsuch Hearing 3/21/17].
10. Sean Sullivan, Gorsuch Calls Attacks on Federal Judges ‘Disheartening’
and ‘Demoralizing,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/2017/live-updates/trump-white-house/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-hearings-
updates-and-analysis-on-the-supreme-court-nominee/gorsuch-calls-attacks-on-fed
eral-judges-disheartening-and-demoralizing/?utm_term=.6c2427cee3fa.
11. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
941 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)).
12. Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Hearing] (statement of Sen. Arlen Spector, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
13. See, e.g., Paul E. Vaglica, Note, Step Aside, Mr. Senator: A Request for
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee to Give Up Their Mics, 87 IND. L.J.
1791, 1805–18 (2012).
14. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 20–22 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter CARTER, CONFIRMATION MESS].
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of substantive legal issues15 and that the nominees in fact answer
most of the questions put to them by the members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.16  This Article adds additional evidence to
support and refine those more recent conclusions, but its focus is
different.  This Article focuses primarily not on what nominees and
senators say about substantive issues of law or on whether nomi-
nees answer the senators’ questions, but instead on the ways that
nominees and senators alike describe the role of the Supreme Court
and its Justices.  In particular, the Article highlights language like
Chief Justice Roberts’s claim that as a Justice, his job would be to
“call balls and strikes” like “an umpire,”17 language that suggests
that the questions the Supreme Court addresses have objectively
correct and discernable answers and the Justices’ job is simply to
identify them.
At his hearing, Judge Gorsuch embraced a similar rhetoric of
neutrality.  Again and again, he refused to offer an opinion on
precedents even as longstanding as Brown v. Board of Education18
(although he did eventually, if circuitously, admit that he believed
Brown was correctly decided)19 and Griswold v. Connecticut,20 in-
sisting instead on describing decided cases as, for example, “a deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court,” and thus, “the law.”21
He insisted that principles of stare decisis themselves are also “the
law,”22 but gave little insight into how he would apply them.23  And
he insisted that “I don’t view my colleagues as Republican judges or
Democrat judges.  I view them as judges . . . .”24
15. PAUL M. COLLINS, JR. & LORI A. RINGHAND, SUPREME COURT CONFIR-
MATION HEARINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 11, 63–99 (2013) [hereinafter
COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS]; Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M.
Collins, Jr., May It Please the Senate: An Empirical Analysis of the Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
589, 601–20 (2011) [hereinafter Ringhand & Collins, May It Please the Senate].
16. Dion Farganis & Justin Wedeking, “No Hints, No Forecasts, No
Previews”: An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Nominee Candor from Harlan
to Kagan, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 525, 527, 540–42 (2011).
17. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 55–56.
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to be Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2017), 3/22/
2017 Fed. News Serv. Transcripts, at 71–72 [hereinafter Gorsuch Hearing 3/22/17].
20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
21. Id. at 72–73.
22. Gorsuch Hearing 3/21/17, supra note 9, at 135.
23. Gorsuch Hearing 3/22/17, supra note 19, at 72–74.
24. Id. at 78.
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But this rhetoric of neutrality dramatically mischaracterizes
what the Court does.25  It matters who is on the Supreme Court
precisely because different Justices have different philosophies
about the law and judging; the language embraced at the hearings
at best, obfuscates that reality.  At the same time, the rhetoric over-
laps with important and uncontroversial commitments to principles
of impartiality and open-mindedness.  But because it so mis-
characterizes the work of the Supreme Court in hard and contested
cases, while precluding any meaningful discussion of the principles
and methods that the Justices do use, this rhetoric may undermine
the Court’s legitimacy.
Part I of the Article briefly reviews the popular critiques of
confirmation hearings and describes the recent empirical research
calling some of that conventional wisdom into question.  Part I also
evaluates recent proposals to address the widespread dissatisfaction
with the hearings, but concludes that these proposals are unlikely to
succeed in part because they are in tension with basic political and
institutional features of Supreme Court nominations.
Part II takes a step back to discuss the role of the Supreme
Court—a necessary first step in determining what confirmation
hearings realistically can and cannot do.  This Part emphasizes that
the work of the Court frequently presents difficult questions to
which answers cannot be logically deduced or definitively located in
objective sources.  Instead, Justices must make difficult, value-laden
judgments in the face of factual complexity and uncertainty, and of
competing constitutional priorities and values.  Depending on their
judicial philosophy and approach to judging, different Justices may
reach different conclusions about the same legal issue, or may reach
the same conclusion but through very different reasoning.  This re-
ality does not, however, mean that the Justices are unconstrained or
lawless; the law, and the norms of lawyering and judging, impose
limits.  Thus, Part II also considers commitments we legitimately
demand of Justices—some of which can be identified as forms of
neutrality.
Part III turns to the content and history of confirmation hear-
ings.  Part III relies and builds on empirical work already com-
pleted, and it also engages in a qualitative analysis of the way that
25. Gorsuch’s claims of neutrality appeared particularly infuriating to Demo-
cratic senators still angry about the Republican-led Senate’s refusal to even con-
sider President Obama’s nominee to replace Justice Scalia, the widely respected
Judge Merrick Garland.  In response to one of Gorsuch’s claims that he does not
see Republican or Democrat judges, for example, Senator Al Franken asked, “If
that’s the case, what was Merrick Garland about?” Id. at 55.
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nominees and senators describe the role of the Supreme Court and
how those descriptions have evolved over time.  More specifically,
this Part divides the history of nominees’ testifying at confirmation
hearings into four major time periods.  During the first period, from
1955 through 1968, hearings fell into one of two categories.  Some
of them, such as the hearings for Justices Charles Whittaker and
Byron White, were brief and chummy formalities.26  But in many
hearings, segregationist senators took the opportunity to inveigh
against Brown v. Board of Education and the Warren Court’s crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence.  In doing so, they described the appro-
priate role of the Court as neutral and objective—noting, for
example, that the Constitution had “a fixed and definite meaning
when . . . adopted,”27 complaining that the Court had improperly
“taken unto itself legislative powers,”28 or that the Court was
“amend[ing]” or “rewrit[ing]” Acts of Congress.29  The rhetoric
these senators used thus rejected any legitimate role for value-laden
judgments and for evaluating competing constitutional principles.
The second major period, from 1969 through 1975, focused
largely on qualifications and ethics, and during this time, discus-
sions of jurisprudence took a back seat.  The third period, however,
from 1981, when Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was nominated to
the Court, through Justice Stephen Breyer’s hearing in 1994, was—
contrary to conventional wisdom—something of a golden age for
confirmation hearings.  Although nominees during this time often
declined to disclose their views on particular legal issues, the hear-
ings were marked by serious discussions about jurisprudence and
judicial philosophy.  And those discussions often acknowledged the
appropriate and significant constraints of law and legal reasoning
without denying that many of the questions that the Supreme Court
26. See Nomination of Charles E. Whittaker, of Missouri, to be Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong. 32–34 (1957) [hereinafter Whittaker Hearing]; Nomination of
Byron R. White, of Colorado, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 22–26
(1962) [hereinafter White Hearing].
27. Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 36 (1957) [hereinafter Brennan Hearing] (statement of
Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
28. Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tennessee, to be Chief Justice of the United
States and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 90th Cong. 197 (1968) [hereinafter Fortas/Thornberry Hearing] (statement of
Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
29. Id. at 129 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
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decides do not have objectively correct, logically deducible answers
and, instead, require the exercise of judgment within the bounds of
law.
Finally, after 2000, the rhetoric of the hearings returned to
claims of neutrality and objectivity—most famously with Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s analogy of the judge to an umpire calling balls and
strikes.30  During this time, however, it was the nominees, more
than the senators, who turned away from the more nuanced discus-
sions of the 1980s and 1990s.  Instead, they tended to describe the
job of a Justice as largely examining documents and engaging in
deductive reasoning to come to objectively correct answers.
Part IV turns to questions of the potential effects of these mis-
descriptions.  More specifically, this Part points to a significant dis-
connect between, on the one hand, the contemporary rhetoric of
neutrality that we hear about during confirmation hearings—and
the expectations such rhetoric can create among the general popu-
lation—and, on the other hand, the observed reality of the Supreme
Court’s work, with Justices who are also described as “liberal” or
“conservative.”  Because of that disconnect, the rhetoric of neutral-
ity can actually work to undermine the institutional legitimacy of
the Court, at least for some populations.  And in our current politi-
cal environment, this dynamic is particularly salient for the political
Right because the Right has claimed the rhetoric of neutrality as a
description of its preferred approaches to (and results of) the judi-
cial process.  Just as the segregationists tried to establish that the
Court in Brown illegitimately imposed the Justices’ own political
and social views, untethered to the Constitution or other legal
sources, so too today, opponents of such decisions as Roe and
Obergefell do the same.
Finally, Part V of the Article proposes that senators, in addi-
tion to asking nominees about their judicial philosophy and views
about particular cases or issues (questions that the nominees may or
may not answer)—ask nominees to acknowledge the inevitability of
value-laden judgments in the work of the Court and to explain why,
within some bounds, different Justices acting in good faith might
well reach different conclusions.  This approach is unlikely to be
revelatory with respect to any particular nominee, nor is it likely to
change the outcome of any particular nomination.  Any effects
would be both subtle and long-term, but such discussions could con-
tribute to a more realistic public view of the Court and its work.
30. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 55–56 (statement of  Then-Judge John
G. Roberts, Jr. J.).
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I. CONFIRMATION MESSES
A. Hearings and the Confirmation Process
We all know the criticisms of confirmation hearings.  The nom-
inees refuse to answer questions,31 the senators grandstand,32 and
the public learns nothing.33  Or the process is highly politicized, and
is sometimes a brutal, even dishonest, descent into efforts at per-
sonal destruction.34  Focusing on the Breyer and Ginsburg hearings,
for example, then-Professor Kagan complained in 1995 that the
Senate, by not insisting on answers to substantive questions about
law, had “abandon[ed] its role and function . . .ceas[ing] to engage
nominees in meaningful discussion of legal issues,”35 and she fa-
mously described the hearings as a “vapid and hollow charade.”36
On the other hand, Professor Stephen Carter has argued that we
should dispense with nominee testimony altogether.37  And many
observers assume that at some point in the past, things were differ-
ent, with Judge Robert Bork’s unsuccessful nomination in 1987, a
turning point.38
31. Kagan, supra note 11, at 920.
32. See, e.g., Vaglica, supra note 13, at 1805–18.
33. Kagan, supra note 11, at 926–27 (lamenting Justice Ginsburg’s and Justice
Breyer’s refusals to answer certain questions at their hearings); see also Edward M.
Kennedy, Outlook, Roberts and Alito Misled Us, WASH. POST. (July 30. 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/28/AR2006072801
489.html (criticizing Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito for not candidly dis-
cussing their views at their confirmation hearings).
34. CARTER, CONFIRMATION MESS, supra note 14, at 11.
35. Kagan, supra note 11, at 920.
36. Id. at 941.  Not surprisingly, several senators reminded Kagan of this char-
acterization during her hearing. See, e.g., Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearing] (state-
ment of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 9 (statement
of Sen. Herb Kohl, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
37. Stephen L. Carter, Opinion, Let the Nominee Stay Home, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/opinion/10carter.html. See also
Stephen L. Carter, Opinion, Disorder in the Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2005), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/opinion/disorder-in-the-court.html.
38. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 921 (citing CARTER, supra note 14) (not-
ing that Carter’s critique of confirmation hearings arises from his negative views
about the Bork hearings); id. at 929–30; Nina Totenberg, Robert Bork’s Supreme
Court Nomination ‘Changed Everything, Maybe Forever’, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO:
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Dec. 19, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/its
allpolitics/2012/12/19/167645600/robert-borks-supreme-court-nomination-changed-
everything-maybe-forever [hereinafter Totenberg, Bork’s Nomination] (quoting
Tom Goldstein, founder and publisher of SCOTUSblog, as saying that the Bork
hearings “legitimized scorched-earth ideological wars over nominations at the Su-
preme Court”).
594 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:585
Recently, however, empirical scholars have begun to go be-
yond these broad claims to investigate the actual content of the
hearings, particularly the exchanges between the senators and the
nominees.  These scholars have concluded that the conventional
wisdom about the evolution of the hearings is flawed.  Lori
Ringhand and Paul Collins, for example, found that senators have
long asked questions of the nominees addressing substantive areas
of law and that both the proportion and absolute number of such
questions have increased over time.39
Ringhand and Collins further argue that these substantive dis-
cussions perform an important democratic function, albeit one that
does not focus primarily on the particular nominee.  Instead, they
claim that the hearings contribute to “ratifying the current constitu-
tional consensus.”40  For example, they chart the role that Brown v.
Board of Education has played in the confirmation hearings over
time.41  In Brown’s immediate aftermath, southern senators excori-
ated the case and its reasoning as illegitimate.42  But over time,
Brown “shift[ed] from a contested case into one sitting in the center
of our constitutional canon.”43  A nominee who rejected Brown to-
day would likely be unconfirmable.44  The significance of the hear-
ings, then, rests on their ability “to validate a gradually, but
regularly shifting[,] constitutional consensus.”45  This work calls
into question the claim that nothing of substance happens during
the hearings.
Ringhand and Collins acknowledge of course that nominees
sometimes claim “the ‘privilege’ against answering . . . questions
that [the nominees] believe raise issues likely to come before them
if they are seated on the High Court.”46  But such refusals to answer
are less common than many assume.  Two other researchers, Dion
Farganis and Justin Wedeking, examined the extent to which nomi-
nees actually answer the senators’ questions.  Farganis and Wedek-
ing found that, contrary to popular perception, a willingness to
39. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 11,
63–99; Ringhand & Collins, Jr., May It Please the Senate, supra note 15, at 598–604.
40. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 4.
41. Id. at 162–76.
42. Id. at 163–65; see also infra, 32–36 & nn. 126–42.
43. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 173.
44. See, e.g., COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note
15, at 176; Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 381, 390 (describing a desire to overrule Brown as so far outside the
legal mainstream that it should preclude confirmation).
45. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 265.
46. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 235,
235 n.14.
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respond, which they call “candor,” has remained more or less con-
stant over time.47  And Ringhand and Collins, using somewhat dif-
ferent methodology, reach similar results.48
On the other hand, the Supreme Court nomination and confir-
mation process is unquestionably politicized.49  Popular wisdom at-
tributes this politicization to the defeat of Robert Bork’s
nomination, but there is evidence to suggest that the Bork nomina-
tion was less seminal in this regard than often claimed.50  Rehn-
quist’s nomination to be Chief Justice, for example, which pre-
dated Bork, exhibited a substantial increase in the number and na-
ture of substantive questions about a nominee’s views.51  And Pro-
fessor Carter begins his book on confirmation hearings by
describing “the most vicious confirmation fight in our history”—the
attempts by segregationists to defeat Thurgood Marshall’s
nomination.52
Regardless, the politicization is more intense than ever.  As
Geoffrey Stone details, the first four nominations of the new mil-
lennium—Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan—were all signifi-
47. Farganis & Wedeking, supra note 16, at 527, 540–42.  They observe a de-
crease in candor from Bork through the Kagan hearings, but they attribute that
decrease not to a change in nominees’ willingness to answer questions but to the
fact that senators are asking more probing questions. Id. at 552.  Moreover, levels
of candor have ebbed and flowed over time, with two earlier periods of similar
downward trends. Id. at 540–41.
48. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at
255–57.
49. See, e.g., JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS,
COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 1 (2009) [hereinafter GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS,
COURTS] (noting that “the preferences of the mass public have been influential in
determining who goes on the Supreme Court”); id. at 2 (noting increased
politicization of nomination process); Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics
of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296, 297 (2006); Lee Ep-
stein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Chad Westerland, The Increasing Importance of Ideology
in the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV.
609, 615 (2008); Stone, supra note 44, at 453; Adam Liptak, John Roberts Criticized
Supreme Court Confirmation Process, Before There Was a Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/us/politics/john-roberts-criti-
cized-supreme-court-confirmation-process-before-there-was-a-vacancy.html.
50. Farganis & Wedeking, supra note 16, at 532.
51. Frank Guliuzza, Daniel J. Reagan, & David M. Barrett, The Senate Judici-
ary Committee and Supreme Court Nominees: Measuring the Dynamics of Confir-
mation Criteria, 56 J. POL. 773, 785 (1994) (finding “no obvious shift” in nature of
questions asked at confirmation hearings between the pre-Bork and post-Bork
eras); Ringhand & Collins, May It Please the Senate, supra note 15, at 598–99.  The
Bork hearings were particularly lengthy and substantive, however.  Kagan, supra
note 11, at 940; Ringhand & Collins, May It Please the Senate, supra note 15, at
598.
52. CARTER, CONFIRMATION MESS, supra note 14, at 3.
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cantly more contested than the nominees’ levels of qualifications
and ethics—and for Sotomayor and Kagan, their moderation—sug-
gest they should have been based on historical comparisons.53
Sotomayor and Kagan received an average of 34 negative votes,
while prior nominees with similar characteristics had an average of
four.54  Alito was confirmed with 42 votes against him.55
Chief Justice Roberts agrees.  Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan
should have “sailed through,” and the “party line[ ]” votes against
them don’t “make any sense.”56  As Stone puts it, senators appar-
ently “believe that the stakes in Supreme Court nominations have
increased.”57  The Republican refusal to consider President Barack
Obama’s nomination of widely respected D.C. Circuit Judge Mer-
rick Garland almost a year before his presidency ended certainly
supports this view,58 as does the nearly unanimous Democratic fili-
buster of Justice Gorsuch, followed by the Republican invocation of
the “nuclear option,” eliminating the filibuster altogether for Su-
preme Court Justices.59
B. Proposed Fixes
Just as there is no shortage of criticism of the confirmation
hearings, so too are there plenty of commentators making recom-
mendations about how to fix them.  These commentators can be
placed into three broad categories:  the minimalists, the burden-of-
proofers, and the debaters.
1. The Minimalists.
The minimalists argue that the Senate should primarily evalu-
ate the nominee’s qualifications and ethics, largely avoiding their
judicial philosophy and approach to judging, and in particular
avoiding discussions of specific issues or cases.60  These commenta-
tors see the purpose of the confirmation hearings—indeed the Sen-
53. Stone, supra note 44, at 453.
54. Id.
55. Liptak, supra note 49.
56. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
57. Stone, supra note 44, at 445.
58. Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet:
No Scalia Replacement Under Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.politi
co.com/story/2016/02/mitch-mcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-
219248.
59. Wilson Andrews et al., How Senators Voted on the Gorsuch Filibuster and
the Nuclear Option, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interac
tive/2017/04/06/us/politics/gorsuch-supreme-court-vote.html.
60. See, e.g., CARTER, CONFIRMATION MESS, supra note 14, 121,161–62 (argu-
ing that the hearings should focus almost exclusively on qualifications, with a mini-
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ate’s primary role in providing “advice and consent” to Supreme
Court appointments—as limited to “ensuring the qualifications of
the nominees.”  Although one can argue (and many have) about
the historical accuracy and theoretical desirability of this ap-
proach,61 as a practical matter, it is impossible.  Given the types of
questions that the Supreme Court addresses, it blinkers reality to
expect senators not to take a nominee’s judicial philosophy into ac-
count, just as the President does.62  Even if the senators cannot ex-
tract information from the nominees themselves, information about
the nominees’ ideology can come from their prior political and pro-
fessional activities.  Regardless of desirability, a nominee’s judicial
philosophy is of enormous importance and, therefore, is and will
continue to be an inevitable focus of the confirmation process, how-
ever much some nominees may attempt to avoid discussing it.
2. The Debaters.
In contrast, some commentators embrace a focus on the nomi-
nees’ judicial philosophy.  These commentators—the debaters—ar-
gue that discussions of “the values embodied in the Constitution
and the proper role of judges in giving effect to those values” dur-
ing confirmation hearings are important and appropriate demo-
cratic checks in the judicial appointment process.63  To the debaters,
the Bork hearings are not a cautionary tale so much as an example
of the democratic process in action.64  Justice Kagan herself made
this argument 15 years before her own nomination, observing with
approval that during Judge Bork’s hearing, “[c]onstitutional law be-
mal check against extremism); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in
Confirming Federal Court Judges, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 127 (2001).
61. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 44, at 414; Ringhand & Collins, May It Please
the Senate, supra note 15, at 594.
62. See, e.g., Epstein, Segal, & Westerland, supra note 49 at 611–12 (describ-
ing President Nixon’s ideological concerns when nominating William Rehnquist)
(citing JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 16 (2001) (quoting memorandum
from Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to Attorney General John
N. Mitchell (May 29, 1969))).
63. Kagan, supra note 11, at 934. See also id. at 935–36, 940–42; Nina
Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988) [hereinafter Totenberg, Confirmation Process];
Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2008), http://www.ny
times.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/13linda.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter,
Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions].
64. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 940; Totenberg, Confirmation Process,
supra note 63, at 1220 (describing the Bork hearings as “the first time the process
worked properly”); Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, supra note 63 (“Through tele-
vised hearings that engaged the public to a rare degree, the debate became a na-
tional referendum on the modern course of constitutional law.”).
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came . . . not a project reserved for judges, but an enterprise to
which the general public turned its attention and contributed.”65
But as Farganis and Wedeking have shown, although nominees
are willing to answer many substantive questions, there is much
they are unwilling to say.  Senators and members of the public may
want to have a robust debate over how potential Justices would do
their jobs and about how they would decide or consider any num-
ber of legal questions, but the nominees do not.  Since the early
1980s, nominees have increasingly declined to answer questions
about matters that “could come before the court,”66 even though
those are the questions that the senators and the public most want
answers to.  All of the nominees have strong incentives to say as
little as possible about anything remotely controversial.
Justice Kagan, herself, is a good example.  At her hearing, Sen-
ator Lindsey Graham reminded her that she had criticized “the way
the Senate conducted these hearings.”67  He asked, “[a]re we im-
proving or going backwards?  And are you doing your part?”68
Then-Solicitor General Kagan responded by complimenting the
senators on “exercising your constitutional duties extremely well.”69
But when Graham asked if it was only previous nominees who had
been “too cagey,”70  Kagan acknowledged that “it just feels a lot
different from here” than from her prior vantage point.71  And in-
deed, she was not appreciably more candid than were Roberts, Al-
ito, or Sotomayor.72
There is little a nominee could say about his or her judicial
philosophy or ideology, much less about his or her views about par-
ticular legal issues, that would not, at best, cause controversy, and
at worst, cost them the nomination.  Indeed, such controversy
would likely arise even if the questions were only about cases that
the Supreme Court has already decided, as Reva Siegel and Robert
65. Kagan, supra note 11, at 940.
66. Farganis & Wedeking, supra note 16, at 555.
67. Kagan Hearing, supra note 11, at 138 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
68. Id.
69. Id. (statement of Elena Kagan, Solic. Gen. of the United States).
70. Id. (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
71. Id. (statement of Elena Kagan, Solic. Gen. of the United States).  The
exchange was very good-natured, as is evident from the video. See UsSenLind-
seyGraham, Senator Graham Questions Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan,
YOUTUBE (Jun. 29, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ac0AcPQLt4.
72. See Farganis & Wedeking, supra note 16, at 541 fig.3.
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Post have suggested.73  Supreme Court nominees are extremely in-
telligent, talented lawyers.74  They will likely continue to handle the
hearings in the way they think makes their confirmation most
likely—by saying as little as possible about their views on contro-
versial legal questions.
3. The Burden-of-Proofers.
Due to the concerns about nominee evasiveness, some com-
mentators have proposed that the senators place a burden of proof
on the nominee.  In other words, these commentators argue, the
senators should announce that they will not vote for the nominees
who do not establish that their ideological commitments are within
some bounds.  These commentators, of course, do not agree with
what those bounds might be.  Christopher Eisgruber, for example,
argues that Americans prefer moderates on the Supreme Court and
so proposes that the senators place a burden of proof on the nomi-
nee to establish that he or she is a moderate, voting against nomi-
nees who fail to do so.75  Geoffrey Stone, on the other hand, argues
that the burden of proof should be placed on the nominee to estab-
lish that he or she is within the mainstream of legal thought.76  Un-
like Eisgruber, Stone argues that the Court benefits from having
“among its members Justices who think boldly as well as care-
fully.”77  He, therefore, proposes a very capacious understanding of
“the mainstream of legal thought,” under which a nominee should
fail “only if most liberals and most conservatives would” consider
the nominee outside the mainstream.78  But regardless of their disa-
greement about the appropriate standard, both Eisgruber and
Stone want senators to engage in some investigation of nominees’
ideology and impose some kind of burden of proof on the nominee.
73. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in
Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38 (2006).
74. Of course, they don’t have to be lawyers—see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2—but today not being a lawyer would almost certainly be disqualifying.
75. CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE, 11–14 (2007).  Steven
Goldberg argues that Senators should distinguish between “ideology,” which is in-
evitable, and “agenda,” which is not.  Steven H. Goldberg, Putting the Supreme
Court Back in Place: Ideology Yes; Agenda No, 17 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 175, 192
(2004).
76. Stone, supra note 44, at 390.
77. Id. at 460.  Stone goes on to explain that “[i]t is in the clash of strongly-
held opposing ideas that the Court is best able to engage the often complex and
vexing issues that are central to its mission.” Id.
78. Id. at 390 (emphasis in the original).  Stone adds that Bork, who stated
that he agreed with the dissents in a number of landmark cases but not that he
would overrule those cases, was within the mainstream under this definition. Id.
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Even if theoretically appealing, however, Eisgruber and
Stone’s proposals are politically impractical in today’s highly po-
larized political environment.  Democratic senators will not hold
Democratic nominees to any particular burden of proof; vice versa
for Republicans.  In other words, today, members of the President’s
party will virtually always vote to confirm.79  Moreover, the terms
of any test of moderation or mainstream legal thought are largely in
the eye of the beholder.  Without long-term bipartisan consensus
and insistence on such burdens of proof, announcing them would be
largely rhetorical and is unlikely to significantly change either the
immediate incentives of the nominees or the nature of the discus-
sions at the hearings.80
79. See Stone, supra note 44, at 416 (showing that since the Bork nomination,
senators have voted in favor of nominees of presidents of their party at a rate of
99%).  This was not always as true as it is today. Id.  For example, Southern Dem-
ocrats voted against Thurgood Marshall and some Democrats voted against cloture
for Justice Fortas’s nomination to be Chief Justice, both nominated by Democratic
President Lyndon Johnson.  See 113 Cong. Rec. 24656 (Aug. 30, 1967), available at
https://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/240_1967.pdf (listing “yea” and
“nay” votes on Marshall nomination); HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESI-
DENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 229–30 (5th ed. 2008) (describing Southern Dem-
ocratic opposition to Marshall); id. at 227–28 (detailing demise of Fortas nomina-
tion, including defection of Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell.  And some
Republicans voted against Nixon’s ill-fated nominations of Carswell and Hayn-
sworth. See 115 Cong. Rec. 35396 (Nov. 21, 1969), available at https://www.senate
.gov/reference/resources/pdf/154_1969.pdfhttps://www.senate.gov/reference/resour
ces/pdf/154_1969.pdf (listing “yea” and “nay votes on Haynsworth nomination);
116 Cong. Rec. 10769 (Apr. 8, 1970), available at https://www.senate.gov/reference/
resources/pdf/122_1970.pdf (listing “yea” and “nay” votes on Carswell
nomination).
80. Indeed, this reality has played out in recent Supreme Court nominations.
When Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were nominated, for example, some Republi-
cans and other conservatives complained that they were outside the mainstream.
See, e.g., Robert Farley, Schumer Claims No One Questioned That Sotomayor Was
Out of the Mainstream, POLITIFACT (Apr. 13, 2010, 12:19 PM), http://www.poli
tifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/apr/13/charles-schumer/schumer-claims-
no-one-questioned-sotomayor-was-out/ (quoting Republican complaints that
Sotomayor was “‘out of the mainstream’ of legal thought”); Ben Smith, Conserva-
tives Target Sotomayor; Kagan; Wood, POLITICO (May 1, 2009, 9:40 AM) (noting
complaints that Kagan, then one of Obama’s potential nominees, was outside the
mainstream).  Likewise, some Democratic senators insisted that Gorsuch meet the
burden of establishing that he is “within the legal mainstream.”  See, e.g., Mark
Abadi, Chuck Schumer Blasts Trump’s Supreme Court pick, setting up lengthy Sen-
ate Battle, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2017, 9:18 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
chuck-schumer-neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-trump-2017-1.  But of course, all of
these nominees were confirmed with the unanimous support of the party of the
nominating president.
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*** *** ***
Although recent scholarship demonstrates that confirmation
hearings have historically been more substantive than many be-
lieve, they are the subject of enormous dissatisfaction.  And most
proposals to address that dissatisfaction are impractical at best.  But
frustrating as that may be, the hearings are here to stay and, as
Ringhand and Collins have shown, can serve important functions in
our democracy.  A focus on what they realistically can accomplish,
therefore, might lead to a different set of recommendations.  The
next Part begins that analysis.
II. NEUTRALITY AND IDEOLOGY AT THE HEARINGS
Any meaningful analysis of how confirmation hearings can and
should function must consider what we expect from the nominees
once they become Supreme Court Justices.  On the one hand, we
expect them, like all judges, to be impartial and open-minded.  We
expect them to recognize the limits of the judicial role—which is
why nominees of both parties regularly and appropriately avow that
they will apply the law, not make it.81  And we expect them to ac-
cept the constraints of legal texts, doctrine, and reasoning as an es-
sential part of the job.
But on the other hand, as individuals who have already had
successful careers in law, politics, and/or academia, Supreme Court
nominees come with attitudes and perspectives that inform their ju-
dicial philosophy.  As then-Justice Rehnquist put it, “[p]roof that a
Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”82  Moreover, the nominee’s
judicial philosophy, or general approach toward judging, will be
central to the job of being a Supreme Court Justice.  The cases do
not decide themselves; they could not be decided by a computer;
discretion and judgment are essential parts of the job.  Indeed, it is
for this very reason that Supreme Court appointments are so hard-
fought and high-stakes.  Especially at the Supreme Court, Justices
must exercise discretion and judgment.  But we must also try to
81. See, e.g., Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103rd Cong. 119 (1994) [hereinafter Breyer Hearing] (statement of Stephen G.
Breyer, J.); Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary,111th Cong, 59 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Hearing (statement of Sonia
Sotomayor, J.).
82. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.).
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identify inappropriate ideological commitments, bias, and over-
reach, and acknowledge appropriate judicial impartiality and open-
mindedness.  This Part takes on those tasks.
A. The Inevitability of Discretion, Judgment, and Ideology
Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation of the umpire obscured im-
portant aspects of what a Supreme Court Justice does.  While there
are cases with relatively straightforward resolutions, as a general
matter, such cases do not end up in the Supreme Court.  Instead,
the Court confronts cases that require the Justices to, for example,
apply constitutional provisions or precedents in new, unforeseen,
and sometimes very complex circumstances, and to weigh compet-
ing legal and constitutional principles.  In such cases, there is no
clear ball or strike to call.  Instead, the Justices must bring to bear
their own philosophies about the Constitution, the roles of, and in-
teraction between, different parts of government, and the nature of
fundamental rights.  At the same time, Justices must understand
and have a deep respect for the law and the constraints it imposes
on the work they do.  The law may rule out certain outcomes alto-
gether, and it always requires that the Justices provide reasoned ex-
planations for their decisions; it imposes frameworks of analysis and
can render certain facts essential or, conversely, irrelevant.
Examples abound of cases in which there is not a logically de-
ducible, “correct” resolution that can be gleaned from the legal
materials, even when those legal materials are crucial to the analy-
sis.  In the recent case of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,83 for
example, the Court had to decide how to apply the “undue burden”
test of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey84
to a set of restrictions on abortion access unlike any it had previ-
ously considered.  No deductive reasoning could lead to an answer
in this case.  Instead, the Court not only had to apply the undue
burden test in the context of a very detailed—and unique—eviden-
tiary record, but more importantly, it had to decide how the balance
struck in Casey, which upheld abortion restrictions justified by the
State’s interest in protecting fetal life, was relevant to restrictions
that were instead justified by claims of protecting women’s health.
Agree with the majority, which struck down the Texas laws, or
agree with the dissent (and I agree with the majority), the case re-
quired the Justices to consider how much deference to give to the
Texas legislature, how broadly or narrowly to read Casey, and how
83. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
84. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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those considerations interacted with the facts of the case, all in the
context of a particularly contentious area of law.  Those determina-
tions required the exercise of judgment.
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts implicitly conceded at his confir-
mation hearing that abortion rights present questions of law that do
not have objectively “correct” answers.  Asked whether he thought
there were “intellectually honest approach[es]” on both sides of
Roe v. Wade,85 he acknowledged that “reasonable people can disa-
gree about that decision.”86  He was right.  All of the questions that
a Justice must consider in evaluating Roe are deeply value-laden.
What does the word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment
mean?87  Does it encompass a woman’s control over her own body?
To the exclusion of other considerations?  Should the understand-
ing of those who drafted and enacted the Fourteenth Amendment,
assuming it can be discerned, take precedence over current views
and jurisprudence about women’s autonomy?  If one does not agree
with the original reasoning of Roe v. Wade, are there other constitu-
tional principles—such as equality—that preclude the government
from preventing a woman from terminating a pregnancy?88  And
even if a Justice believes that Roe was wrongly decided on any
grounds, he or she must consider, as Justices Kennedy, O’Connor,
and Souter famously did in their joint opinion in Casey, whether
there are nonetheless important reasons not to overrule it outright.
To answer these questions, a Justice must consider the constitu-
tional significance of women’s bodily autonomy, the importance of
the state’s interest in protecting fetal life, the role of courts in mak-
ing those judgments, and the societal and institutional effects of
overruling a case as significant as Roe.  Some of these questions
involve predictive judgments about the world, and some are less
about factual predictions than they are about constitutional princi-
ples and values:  the relative role of the Courts and the legislatures,
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 206 (statement of John G. Roberts, J.).
87. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Classical
Constitution and the Historical Constitution: Separated at Birth, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 991, 999–1004 (2014) (discussing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT
(2014), and arguing that Roe is consistent with Epstein’s concerns about the bur-
dens of economic regulation).
88. See, e.g., Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 103d Cong. 205–08 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearing] (statement of Ruth
Bader Ginsberg, J.) (discussing equality principles and religious freedom as addi-
tional bases supporting constitutional recognition of a woman’s right to choose
whether to bear a child).
604 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:585
the significance of fetal life, and whether control of her body is an
essential part of a woman’s liberty.
Nor do such questions end with abortion.  What of access to
contraception, which the Supreme Court held more than 40 years
ago in Griswold v. Connecticut89 that states could not prohibit?  The
text of the Constitution does not discuss birth control or even ex-
plicitly mention the types of privacy and self-determination that a
ban on birth control would implicate.  Even a Justice who believes,
like Judge Bork, that this silence suggests no constitutional protec-
tion beyond the minimum requirement of rationality,90 would have
to grapple with the value-laden considerations of stare decisis
before deciding whether to overrule Griswold.91
Even less hot-button areas of law are no different.  Consider,
for example, United States v. Alvarez,92 in which the Supreme Court
held that the Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized misrepresenta-
tions about whether someone had received military decorations and
medals, violated the First Amendment.93  Six Justices reached that
89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
90. See, e.g., Nomination of Robert Bork, to be Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 114–18 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearing] (statement of Robert Bork,
J.).  Bork did not outright deny that there was constitutional protection for access
to birth control for married couples.  Rather, he said that he had not heard an
argument that would lead him to so conclude. Id. at 116.
91. Some argue that originalism and textualism allow a judge to reach conclu-
sions without having to make value-laden judgments. See, e.g., Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY (2005)) (arguing that textualism-originalism “is not an ideological posi-
tion, but one that safeguards the distinction between law and politics” and that “in
principle the textualist-originalist approach supplies an objective basis for judg-
ment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance”). See also,
e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Good Justice is Just a Judge by Another Name, LI-
BRARY L. & LIBERTY (July 10, 2017) (arguing that Supreme Court cases can and
should be addressed through “formalism”).  Problems of stare decisis alone rebut
this proposition. Cf. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong. 46 (1986) [hereinafter Scalia Hearing] (discussing the “practical
exercise” and “difficult question” of determining which precedents, even if wrong
in the first place, “are so woven in the fabric of law that mistakes made are too late
to correct, and which are not”); Bork Hearing, supra note 90, at 128–29 (statement
of Robert Bork, J.) (discussing factors relevant to a decision to overrule prece-
dent).  But in fact, originalism and textualism do not and cannot live up to their
promise of objectivity and judicial restraint.  Establishing that proposition is be-
yond the scope of this Article, but fortunately, others have already done so. See,
e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CON-
STITUTION (2005); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59
DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
92. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012) (plurality opinion).
93. Id.
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conclusion, but there was a plurality opinion with four Justices, a
concurrence in the judgment with two Justices, and three Justices
who dissented.  The disagreements between these opinions illus-
trate the ways that the Court must exercise judgment and weigh
competing interests.
The Alvarez plurality held that the statute outlawed content-
based speech, requiring the government to meet a particularly “ex-
acting” standard to justify the law and concluding that the govern-
ment had failed to show that the statute was “actually necessary”94
to meet its compelling interest in “protecting the integrity of the
Medal of Honor.”95  Specifically, the plurality noted that “the
[g]overnment has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech
would not suffice to achieve its interest.”96  Justice Breyer, joined
by Justice Kagan, on the other hand, agreed with the outcome but
took a less categorical approach, applying only intermediate scru-
tiny and suggesting ways that the statute could be rewritten or nar-
rowed to survive constitutional challenge.97  The two groups of
Justices in the majority, then, were not in agreement about how to
evaluate the burden the statute imposed.  And the dissenters, who
found the law justified by the government interests at stake, be-
lieved that the false statements at issue “inflict real harm.”98  They
expressly disagreed both with the two other opinions’ view that
there were effective alternatives to protect the government’s legiti-
mate interests in maintaining the integrity of military honors and
with the concurrence’s concern that the false statements at issue
should be protected prophylactically so as to avoid chilling other
kinds of speech and to ward off an overbearing government.99
The determinations and judgments that the Justices made in
Alvarez simply cannot be deduced from the text of the Constitution
or from the bodies of case law interpreting it.  That the Justices in
Alvarez disagreed with each other does not mean, however, that
law played no role.  Law structured the analysis of all three opin-
ions, it required the Justices to take into account certain types of
considerations, and it led even the dissenters to suggest that their
conclusion could not easily be generalized to other contexts be-
cause it was based in part on the unique nature of the interest at
stake.100
94. Id. at 715.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 726.
97. Id. at 730–38 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
98. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting)
99. Id. at 744–45, 750–52.
100. Id. at 753–54.
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Sometimes legal texts themselves explicitly call for value-laden
judgments.  For instance, the Fourth Amendment itself provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . .”101  When a judge (at any level of the judicial
system) decides what is reasonable in a unique factual situation, he
or she is exercising judgment and discretion.  And it is likely that in
exercising that judgment and discretion, a judge’s overall sense of
how the police do their jobs, what ordinary people’s expectations of
privacy are, and the likelihood and consequences of criminal con-
duct going undetected will all play a role.102  In other words, the
judge must make a value-laden assessment of a very specific factual
situation.  And as the rich body of Supreme Court precedent in the
Fourth Amendment context attests, there are a seemingly infinite
number of factual contexts in which these assessments must be
made.
Nor are such value-laden determinations or predictions about
the world unique to constitutional law.  Consider, for example, the
question that faced the courts in Brown v. Plata.103  In that case, a
three-judge district court found that prison overcrowding in Califor-
nia violated the Eighth Amendment and ordered that some prison-
ers be released.  As required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
in crafting this order, the district court gave “substantial weight to
any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal
justice system caused by the relief.”104  The Supreme Court upheld
the order.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia objected to the majority’s
deference to the district court’s factual findings on the public safety
issue:
But the idea that the three District Judges in this case relied
solely on the credibility of the testifying expert witnesses is fanci-
ful. Of course they were relying largely on their own beliefs
about penology and recidivism.  And of course different district
judges, of different policy views, would have “found” that reha-
bilitation would not work and that releasing prisoners would in-
crease the crime rate.  I am not saying that the District Judges
rendered their factual findings in bad faith.  I am saying that it is
101. U.S. CONST., amend. IV (emphasis added). See also STEPHEN G.
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 160 (2010) (ex-
plaining why the language of Fourth Amendment requires judges to consider “val-
ues and proportionality” when applying it).
102. Compare, for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Utah v.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
103. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(A)(1)(a) (2012).
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impossible for judges to make “factual findings” without in-
serting their own policy judgments, when the factual findings are
policy judgments.105
Whether one agrees with the majority or with the dissent in
Plata, Justice Scalia is correct about the nature of the policy judg-
ments that are essential to the case.  And what he says is also true
of an enormous amount of the work of judges in general and Su-
preme Court Justices in particular.106  Given the significance for the
entire country of the decisions the Supreme Court makes, it is little
wonder that the senators and the American people want to know
about the nominees’ judicial philosophy, their overall approach to
considering hard questions and balancing competing interests.
B. Proper and Improper Ideological Commitments, Impartiality,
and Open-Mindedness
1. Ideology, or Judicial Philosophy, or Subjectivity.
Despite the reality that value-laden judgments are part of the
job, Justices operate within important constraints and their discre-
tion is not unbounded.  All nominees understand that although the
Court may decide cases in open areas, it is also constrained by all of
the traditional sources of law, such as text and precedent.  We ex-
pect all judges and Justices to accept and uphold the Constitution
and our system of government.  Such allegiance is inconsistent with
an ideological commitment to an incompatible world view and po-
litical agenda, such as Marxism.  Nor is nakedly partisan decision-
making appropriate.  One of the most persistent critiques of Bush v.
Gore107 is that the Justices voted as they did because they wanted
Bush (or Gore) to win the election, a clearly inappropriate basis for
a ruling.
Similarly, nominees are sometimes asked to disavow other
types of behaviors or approaches to judging that we can all agree
would be improper.  Senators have sometimes asked Supreme
Court nominees to disavow any role in their judging for “personal
philosophy”108 or “personal notions.”109  To at least some senators
105. Plata, 563 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
106. For an extensive and illuminating discussion of this reality and its impli-
cations with particular attention to Plata, see Dan L. Kahan, The Supreme Court
2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011).
107. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
108. See, e.g., Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 18–19 (1993)
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and nominees, these concerns were understood as an insistence that
personal sympathies for one party or one type of party could not be
the basis of a constitutional decision.  At his 1971 confirmation
hearing, for example, William Rehnquist himself explained that he
believed some of the Warren Court Justices (and their law clerks)
had been motivated by their “sympathi[es] with the plight of un-
popular groups, such as Communists.”110  At its most extreme, and
most clearly improper, if a Justice believes that the government
generally has too much power in relation to criminal suspects, he
might vote in favor of all criminal defendants even in the absence of
legal support for those outcomes.  Conversely, it would be just as
improper for a Justice who believed that criminality had run amok
to vote against all criminal defendants regardless of the law.
But the line between legitimate and illegitimate subjectivity or
ideology in judicial decision-making is not always so bright.  The
presence or absence of illegitimate ideological decision-making is
often in the eyes of the beholder.111  Whatever it is called, however,
ideology is an inevitable and legitimate component of what the Su-
preme Court does.112
2. Impartiality and Open-Mindedness
Although we should acknowledge that value judgments and
ideology play a role in judicial decision-making, we can and do le-
gitimately demand certain types of neutrality.  Judges must evaluate
each claim before them without regard for the identity of the par-
ties.  As Justice Kagan explained in her confirmation hearings,
Chief Justice Roberts’s umpire analogy aptly captures this form of
neutrality.113  Just as we do not want an umpire to be secretly root-
ing for one team over another—and allowing that preference to af-
fect his calls—so we expect the same of judges.114  Justice
Sotomayor emphasized this type of neutrality repeatedly in her
[hereinafter Rehnquist/Powell Hearing] (statement of Sen. John L. McLellan,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
109. Id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
110. Id. at 28.
111. See discussion, infra Part IV.
112. Some may choose to use different, perhaps less charged, language, to
describe this aspect of the judicial role.  Judge Posner, for example, likes the terms
“open area” and “legal uncertainty.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
9, 11 (2010).  He uses more controversial language, however, when he describes
judges as “occasional legislators” and calls the Supreme Court as a “political
court.” Id. at 78–92, 269–323.
113. Kagan Hearing, supra note 11, at 202.
114. Id.
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confirmation hearings.  As senators asked her again and again to
explain her remark that “a wise Latina” judge might reach a better
decision than some other judges, then-Judge Sotomayor insisted
again and again that her personal sympathies or prejudices had no
bearing whatsoever on her rulings in cases.115  No response other
than such assurances would have been appropriate.  Indeed, virtu-
ally every nominee makes such claims.116  We can call this form of
neutrality “impartiality.”
In addition, a good judge is one who is willing to consider new
arguments, to consider the possibility that his or her initial impres-
sion of a case might be wrong.  Many nominees describe their ap-
proach to judging in these terms.  Rehnquist and Souter, for
example, emphasized that they were “open-minded”117 and “willing
to listen.”118  Then-Judge Alito described his decision-making pro-
cess as “putting out of my mind any personal thoughts that I had on
the matter and thinking about—listening to all the arguments and
reading the briefs . . .  and only at the end of that reach a conclusion
about the issue.”119  This open-mindedness may be in some tension
with a judge’s pre-existing judicial philosophy, but it is an important
tension.  In his 1986 confirmation hearings to be Chief Justice, then-
115. See Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 81, at 66, 70–73, 124–26, 392–93.
116. See, e.g., Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tennessee, to be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 50 (1965) [hereinafter Fortas Hearing I] (promising that his
relationship with the President could never “in any way enter into any judgment
that [he] might make”); Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, of Florida, to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 17 (1970) [hereinafter Carswell Hearing].
117. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 205 (1986) [hereinafter Rehnquist Hearing II].
118. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 177 (1990) [hereinafter Souter Hearing].
119. Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 386 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing]; see also id. at 404–05 (describing
judicial decision-making process in more detail). See also, e.g., Nomination of
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong. 76–77 (1969) [hereinafter Haynsworth Hearing] (declining to comment
on issues that might come before the Court “where I haven’t read the briefs or
haven’t heard the lawyers and in a field, too, which I think I should approach with
an open mind when the case comes up, and not on the basis of some expression of
a prior opinion”); Fortas Hearing I, supra note 116, at 53–54 (discussing possible
implications of recent one-man-one-vote precedent); id. at 57; Roberts Hearing,
supra note 12, at 238 (promising to “confront issues in [the abortion] area as any
other area, with an open mind, in light of the arguments, in light of the record,
after careful consideration of the views of my colleagues on the bench”).
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Justice Rehnquist distinguished elegantly between the impartiality
and open-mindedness that we demand and the reality that judicial
philosophy inevitably plays a role in judging:
You know, that is not to say that I do not have ideas, which I
have certainly followed; I have a sense of what I think the Consti-
tution means.  But it certainly is not a sense that is, fixed on con-
crete and all.  I am one of the few members of our Court who can
present both exhibit A and exhibit B in support of open-minded-
ness.  On two separate instances since I have been on the Court, I
have written opinions for the Court overruling earlier opinions
that I have written, which is certainly some testimony to open-
mindedness.120
Here too, the umpire analogy can be helpful.  An umpire should
not decide before the pitch is thrown that this particular pitcher
always throws balls in this situation.  Each pitch must be evaluated
on its own terms.  Likewise, Justices must be willing to keep an
open mind as they evaluate the facts and legal arguments in each
case.
III. CONFUSING NEUTRALITY
Impartiality, open-mindedness, and disavowal of improper ide-
ological commitments can all be seen as forms of neutrality, as can
the vision of judging that the umpire metaphor most vividly
evoked—seeking a single, objectively correct answer.  The history
of confirmation hearings is integrally tied to this latter, and, as al-
ready demonstrated, inaccurate vision of judging, especially on the
Supreme Court.  This Part explores that history, with a focus on the
ways the nominees and senators alike have described the role of the
Supreme Court Justice.121
Since 1955, the Senate Judiciary Committee has held confirma-
tion hearings on 31 separate nominees, all of whom testified in per-
120. Rehnquist Hearing II, supra note 117, at 205 (emphasis added).
121. Statistics reported in this Part are drawn both from my own coding pro-
ject, described in Carolyn Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality and Confessing Subjectivity
in Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 455, 465–68
(2013) [hereinafter Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality], and from analysis of the dataset
created by Ringhand and Collins.  All reported statistics are significant at (at least)
a p>.05 level and were generated using Stata12.  As described in Claiming Neutral-
ity, I recruited law students who coded the colloquies between senators and nomi-
nees through 2010.  “Within each round, law students were instructed to identify
. . . whether the nominee made claims that judging is a neutral or objective enter-
prise and whether he or she acknowledged the inevitable role of subjectivity.” Id.
at 466.  The students also coded the senators’ comments and questions in the same
way.  I then consolidated the data into 332 unique senator-nominee pairs. Id.
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son.122  Out of these 31 nominees, ten were nominated by a
Democratic president and 21 by a Republican president, and all but
five were confirmed.123  Although Republican presidents have
made twice as many nominations as Democratic presidents, almost
all of the nominations, by either party, were considered by a Senate
under Democratic control.  All ten of the Democratic nominees
were made to Democratic-controlled Senates, and only five Repub-
lican nominees were made to a Republican Senate.124  Table I pro-
vides basic information on the nominees.
These 31 hearings can be loosely grouped into four time
periods:
1. The Segregationists’ Last Stand, 1955–1968 (Harlan-For-
tas/Thornberry)
2. Ethics, Background, and Qualifications, 1969–1975
(Burger-Stevens)
3. The Golden Age, 1981–1994 (O’Connor-Breyer)
4. The Age of the Umpire, 2005–2017 (Roberts-
Gorsuch).125
During the first period, rhetoric implying that there are objectively
correct answers to difficult constitutional questions dominated the
senators’ substantive discussions.  During the second period, this
122. Two individuals were nominated twice:  Rehnquist and Fortas each ap-
peared both when appointed to be an Associate Justice and later when nominated
for Chief Justice.  I count each nomination separately.
123. The failed nominations were Fortas in his bid to be Chief Justice,
Thornberry, who was being nominated for Fortas’s Associate Justice spot, Hayn-
sworth, Carswell, and Bork.  There have also been a few failed nominations—nota-
bly Douglas Ginsburg and Harriet Miers—where the nomination was withdrawn
before a hearing could be held.  These nominations are not considered in this
Article.
124. These nominees were O’Connor, Scalia, Rehnquist (when nominated for
Chief Justice), Roberts, and Alito.  Note, then, that we have no examples of Dem-
ocratic nominees being nominated to a Republican Senate. See Stone, supra note
44, at 386.  Had he been given a hearing, Merrick Garland would have been the
first such nominee.
125. These four periods are not scientifically determined, but there are solid
bases for the distinctions.  Periods Three and Four each begin after a number of
years—and at least one complete four-year presidential term—during which there
were no Supreme Court nominations.  Six years (and the entire Carter presidency)
passed between Justice Stevens’s nomination in 1975 and Justice O’Connor’s in
1981.  And even more dramatically, between Justice Breyer’s nomination in 1994
and Chief Justice Roberts’s in 2005, 11 years went by, along with Bill Clinton’s
second term and George W. Bush’s first.  The division between Periods One and
Two is somewhat more subjective, as there was no comparable chronological
break.  But there was a clear shift in tone following Justice Fortas’s resignation
under an ethical cloud and the transition in the presidency from President Johnson,
a Democrat, to President Nixon, a Republican.
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rhetoric faded.  The third period provided surprisingly robust and
candid discussions of judicial philosophy, although the nominees
unsurprisingly maintained commitments to impartiality, open-mind-
edness, and the constraints of the judicial role.  In the fourth period,
however, the umpire analogy came to the fore, and the nominees—
at least as much as the senators—came to embrace this inaccurate
description of the job they were seeking.  Put another way, in these
hearings, nominees often made commitments to appropriate neu-
trality, while providing little-to-no insight into their judicial philoso-
phies.  As a result, the impression that emerges is that there are
logically deducible correct answers and little-to-no room for discre-
tion.  And in the most recent hearing, Justice Gorsuch embraced
this formalistic description of the job with particular fervor.
A. Period One:  The Segregationists’ Last Stand, 1955–1968
Only after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation did it become standard practice for every nominee to person-
ally testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee.  This timing is
no coincidence.  In those early years, the hearings were dominated
by ardent segregationists, including the committee chair, Senator
James Eastland of Mississippi and his colleagues Senator John Mc-
Clellan of Arkansas and Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina.
And by the mid-1960s, they were joined by Senator Strom Thur-
mond of South Carolina.126  These four senators alone asked almost
65 percent of all of the questions posed to the nominees between
the first hearing after Brown until Chief Justice Burger’s confirma-
tion hearings in 1969. If what Ringhand and Collins describe as
“hearing administration and chatter” is omitted,127 leaving only
questions that could plausibly be related to substance, they asked
70 percent of the questions.128  Indeed, most senators said nothing
at all.
126. Eastland, McClellan, and Ervin were all Democrats.  Thurmond, al-
though originally a Democrat, had become a Republican by the time he joined the
committee.
127. According to Ringhand and Collins, this category includes “[h]earing
[a]dministration and [c]hatter; [c]haracter and [b]ackground, [e]thics of [n]ominee;
[d]iscussion of [m]edia [c]overage or [s]pin [a]bout the [h]earings of the [n]ominee;
[d]iscussions of [p]re-[h]earing [c]onversations or [c]oaching or [c]ontact [b]etween
the [n]ominee and [e]xecutive [o]fficials or [o]thers.”  Ringhand & Collins, May It
Please the Senate, supra note 15, at 638 app. B.
128. I initially found these results counterintuitive.  Because Eastland was the
chair, I assumed that omitting chatter would reduce the percentage of questions
asked by segregationists.  I suspect that the opposite is the case because many of
the questions asked by the other senators were non-substantive:   general declara-
tions of support for the nominee, for example, or simply passing on the opportu-
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The segregationist senators were deeply unhappy about
Brown, and they seized the opportunity presented by the hearings
to emphasize their view that Brown was illegitimate.  During Potter
Stewart’s 1959 confirmation hearing, for example, Senator Ervin
made a lengthy speech condemning Brown as “a most unfortunate
decision from the standpoint of law, [c]onstitutional law in the
United States.”129  As the 1960s wore on, complaints about Brown
itself gave way to complaints about the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence.130  Both before and after the shift away
from Brown, however, these senators presented a remarkably con-
sistent vision of the appropriate role of the Supreme Court, and
that vision was couched in the language of neutrality and
objectivity.
More specifically, these senators repeatedly argued that the
Constitution’s meaning was fixed when it was ratified.  As Senator
Ervin put it in his diatribe at the Stewart hearing, the Court “should
have turned the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment was ratified”131 to consider what the ratifiers and drafters
thought and did with respect to segregation in schools.132  When the
Supreme Court “updated” the Constitution (as these senators
claimed it had in Brown) or overruled constitutional precedent
(likewise), it was imposing the policy preferences of unelected Jus-
tices on the rest of the country, making the Constitution itself
meaningless or illegitimately amending it.133  The legislative power
is vested only in Congress, and the judicial branch should not “legis-
late from the bench.”  Judicial restraint requires recognizing all of
nity to ask questions.  Moreover, although Eastland, McClellan, Ervin, and
Thurmond were the most active questioners, they were not the only unhappy
southerners on the committee.  All told, segregationists asked 69 percent of the
questions overall and more than 73 percent of the substantive questions.
129. Nomination of Potter Stewart to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong. 124–30 (1959) [hereinafter Stewart Hearing].  It was apparently a speech his
colleagues had heard before.  Senator Ervin announced that he “want[ed] to talk a
little bit about the Brown case so folks can understand our position.” Id. at 124.
At this point, Senator Dirksen interjected with sarcasm that is apparent even from
the cold transcript:  “Sam, I haven’t heard you talk about the Brown decision.” Id.
130. See COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at
167–68 (describing the evolution of discussions of Brown during the 1960s).
131. Stewart Hearing, supra note 129, at 124.
132. Id. at 125–28.
133. See, e.g., id. at 130; Fortas Hearing I, supra note 116, at 55 (statement of
Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (describing as “dan-
gerous . . . the fact that judges can take the due-process clause and make it mean
almost anything they want it to mean”).
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the above and acting accordingly.  As Senator Ervin put it during
Justice Marshall’s confirmation hearings,
the road to destruction of constitutional government in the
United States is being paved by the good intentions of the judi-
cial activists, who, all too often, constitute a majority of the Su-
preme Court.  A judicial activist, in my book, is a man . . . who is
willing to add to the Constitution things that are not in it, and to
subtract from the Constitution things which are in it.134
These statements are not particularly surprising.  Indeed, there
is a long tradition of such complaints by commentators, politicians,
activists, academics, and dissenting judges who are unhappy with
Supreme Court decisions and complain about activist Justices.135
Nor do these complaints always come from the Right.  But a few
things about this rhetoric are worth noting.
First, the rhetoric implies that there are objectively correct an-
swers to constitutional questions, that finding those answers re-
quires discerning the framers’ intent, and that all other
interpretations—or approaches to interpretation—are lawless and
activist.  Although no senator or nominee would attack Brown on
these grounds today, that rhetoric is likely to be familiar to the
modern reader.
Second, the Warren Court’s opponents sometimes framed their
questions so that there really was no right answer other than to
agree.  In other words, they couched their claims about the exclu-
sive validity of a particular jurisprudential approach (and by exten-
sion, the invalidity of many of the holdings of the Warren Court), in
language that also referenced improper considerations.  Consider,
for example, a question posed to Justice Harlan136 by Senator East-
land, chairman of the committee—a question he said had been
134. Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, of New York, to be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 155–56 (1967) [hereinafter Marshall Hearing].
135. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, How Activist is the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/sunday-review/how-activist-is-
the-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all; THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATIV-
ISM (2004).
136. Harlan faced opposition, particularly by Southerners, who “contend[ed]
that he was ‘ultra-liberal,’ hostile to the South, [and] dedicated to reforming the
Constitution by ‘judicial fiat.’” ABRAHAM, supra note 79, at 206. See also Norman
Dorsen, The Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 652, 658
(2006) (noting that “the segregationist chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, James Eastland, delayed the confirmation of Justice Harlan for several months
in 1955 because of the (correct) assumption that, as a Justice, Harlan would sup-
port civil rights”).  Harlan’s pride that his grandfather had authored the famous
2018] THE LANGUAGE OF NEUTRALITY 615
given to him by another, unnamed senator:  “Do you believe the
Supreme Court of the United States should change established in-
terpretations of the Constitution to accord with the economic, polit-
ical, or sociological views of those who from time to time constitute
the membership of the Court?”137
There is, of course, only one appropriate answer to the ques-
tion as posed, and Justice Harlan gave that answer.  He unsurpris-
ingly pledged to set aside his “personal predilections so far as it is
possible to do so and to decide issues before him according to the
law and the facts and the Constitution.”138  The rhetoric of these
early hearings thus conflated rejection of a judicial activism no
nominee could or should defend—the right to change the meaning
of the Constitution at whim—with a particular approach to consti-
tutional interpretation—the (purported) originalism promoted by
the segregationists.  And the nominees did not generally explain
that the two ideas could be distinguished.
Third, not all the nominees during this period were subjected
to the same types or amounts of questioning.  Some received the
full force of the segregationists’ displeasure with the Warren Court.
As already mentioned, Senator Ervin seized the occasion of Justice
Stewart’s hearing to make a speech about Brown.  Justice Mar-
shall’s hearing was especially notable in terms of both its length and
its hostility.  In particular, during Marshall’s hearing, Senator Thur-
mond was at his most vocal, and his questioning was
“venemous.”139  Other nominees who were challenged at some
length to disclaim judicial activism and commit to not legislate from
the bench, for example, included Justices Harlan, Brennan, and
Goldberg.  And in 1968, when Chief Justice Earl Warren an-
nounced his retirement and President Johnson nominated Associ-
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), could not have helped his stand-
ing with the segregationists. See ABRAHAM, supra note 79, at 206-07.
137. Nomination of John Marshall Harlan, of New York, to be Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong. 140 (1955) [hereinafter Harlan Hearing].
138. Id. at 141.  Eastland responded:  “Of course, I knew you would answer it
that way.”  He then followed with two other questions:  Did Justice Harlan believe
that the Court could change “established interpretations” of the Constitution,
given the difficulty of amending it through the means delineated in, and “is the
legislative power as effectually denied to the courts of the United States by the
Constitution as it is to the Executive?” Id.  As Justice Harlan drily noted about the
last question, the question “ought to carry its own answer[s].” Id.
139. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at
169.  Among other things, Thurmond quizzed Marshall on historical trivia in an
apparent attempt to humiliate him. See Marshall Hearing, supra note 134, at
161–72.
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ate Justice Abe Fortas to take his place,140 the hearing for Fortas’s
elevation was, in many ways, a classic example of the segregation-
ists’ approach.  As a member of the Warren Court since 1965, For-
tas was an appealing target for unhappy senators.  Senators Ervin
and Thurmond, for example, gave lengthy exegeses about what they
deemed wrong with the Warren Court jurisprudence.141  Ervin com-
plained about the Court “rewrit[ing] an act of Congress . . . which
clearly violated the constitutional provision vested in the power of
the legislating Congress [sic].”142  Thurmond asked Fortas repeat-
edly to explain his votes in various Supreme Court opinions includ-
ing, for example, Harper v. State Board of Elections,143 which held
that poll taxes violate the Equal Protection Clause.144  Fortas re-
fused to respond to questions about specific cases.145
But other nominees received different treatment.  Justice
Charles Whittaker’s 1957 testimony takes up exactly three pages of
transcript and consists largely of biographical information—some
of it clearly designed to charm (he rode a pony to high school
“through 6 miles of mud night and morning . . . ”)146—along with
some mild questioning about his decisions in a case brought by a
frustrated attorney who appeared before the Committee to testify
against Whittaker’s appointment.147  Justice White received similar
treatment in 1962.  The transcript of his committee appearance
takes up four-and-a-half transcript pages.148  And ironically in light
of his treatment at his second hearing, Abe Fortas’s hearing in 1965
to become an Associate Justice was extremely short.  Including the
testimony of other witnesses, the entire hearing lasted less than
three hours, and there was virtually no discussion of judicial
philosophy.149
140. At the same time, Johnson also nominated Fifth Circuit Judge Homer
Thornberry for the Associate Justice seat that Fortas would be vacating.
141. Fortas/Thornberry Hearing, supra note 28, at 126–68 (statements of Sen-
ator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 180–224, 231–47
(statements of Senator Strom Thurmond, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
142. Id. at 129.
143. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
144. Id.
145. Fortas/Thornberry Hearing, supra note 28, at 181–82, 189.
146. Whittaker Hearing, supra note 26, at 32.
147. Id. at 32–33.  In another quirk of the early hearings, this witness, Fyke
Farmer, interjected several times during Whittaker’s own testimony. Id. at 33.
148. White Hearing, supra note 26, at 22–26.
149. Fortas Hearing I, supra, note 116, at 1–57.  The most substantive discus-
sions involved some questions about Fortas’s views on balancing the interests of
the accused and the interests of society and about whether he believed that the
recent decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), establishing the one-per-
son-one-vote principle, called into question the allotment of two senators per state
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Finally, during this period of time, there was remarkably little
effort by other senators, or even by the nominees themselves, to
articulate or discuss a different view.  Such efforts existed,150 but
overall, between 1955 and 1968, there was only an 18 percent
chance of a senator acknowledging room for judgment and subjec-
tivity in colloquy with any particular nominee, compared to a 33
percent chance in all other periods combined.  Some of the nomi-
nees did articulate an alternative view—Justice Goldberg, for ex-
ample, explained that while a judge “would be derelict in [his] duty
if [he] construed the Constitution to be such a broad document that
anything is permitted,” still, “reasonable men may differ, and they
do, about interpretation” of the Constitution.151  Overall, however,
nominees, too, were less than half as likely to acknowledge the
room for judgment during Period One than in the rest of the peri-
ods combined.152
regardless of population. Id. at 51–54 (statements of Senator Hiram L, Fong, Mem-
ber, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, and Abe Fortas).
150. See, e.g., Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 39 (1957) [hereinafter Brennan Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Arthur V. Watkins, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (argu-
ing that a judge should decide a constitutional issue “in the best light [he] ha[s] and
the best intelligence according to [his] conscience”); id. at 38, 40 (statements of
Senator Alexander Wiley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (arguing that
“[t]he Constitution is a living thing, it is not meant to be a dead thing,” and that
“[i]t is meant to keep America alive in the changing world in which we live . . . [i]t
is meant to be a vital dynamic thing to preserve our rights”).  Just as it may sur-
prise some of today’s readers that the most ardent proponents of originalism were
Democrats, it may be surprising that both Senator Watkins and Senator Wiley
were Republicans.
151. Nomination of Arthur J. Goldberg, of Illinois, to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 87th Cong. 27 (1962) [hereinafter Goldberg Hearing]. See also, e.g., id. at 26
(noting that the Framers wisely “drafted the Constitution . . . in broad terms so
that new conditions could be taken into account”); Stewart Hearing, supra note
129, at 16 (describing how much “the power over interstate commerce which was
given in that document to the Federal Government, has in detail and specifically
quite a different meaning from what the framers of that document could ever im-
agine that it could have because that was written before there were automobiles,
before there steam boats, certainly before there were airplanes, or atomic energy,”
and noting that “[t]he genius of the framers is that [the Commerce Clause] . . . is
applicable to changing [sic] and growing society”).
152. Cf. Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality, supra note 121, at 468 (reporting that
nominees became more likely to acknowledge subjectivity in judging over time, at
least before 2000).
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B. Period Two:  Ethics, Background, and Qualifications,
1969–1975
Justice Fortas’s 1968 nomination to become Chief Justice
turned out to be highly controversial in part for reasons other than
his jurisprudence—specifically because of ethical concerns.  The
very first questions he was asked at his confirmation hearing were
about his conduct while a Justice:  had he inappropriately helped
people get jobs in the Executive Branch, and had he inappropri-
ately consulted with the President on matters that would or could
come before the Court.153  Ultimately, Justice Fortas’s nomination
for Chief Justice fell to a filibuster in the Senate,154 and about a
year later, under an ethical cloud, he resigned from the Court
altogether.155
Additionally, President Nixon’s 1969 nomination of Clement
Haynsworth to fill Abe Fortas’s vacated Associate Justice seat
raised its own concerns about ethics, in particular Judge Hayn-
sworth’s recusal practices and business interests.156  During that
hearing, more than 80 percent of the senators who spoke raised
questions related to ethics and background—almost twice the aver-
age of all other confirmation hearings—and almost 80 percent of
the questions asked of Haynsworth involved such matters.157
Haynsworth’s nomination was defeated by a vote of 55 to 45.158
The Haynsworth and Fortas nominations set an important pre-
cedent.159  Indeed, senators continue to see the investigation of a
153. Fortas Hearing I, supra note 116, at 103–105 (colloquy with Senator
James O. Eastland, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). See also id. at 164–68
(similar questioning from Senator Ervin).
154. Judge Thornberry’s nomination was therefore not considered further,
and he never received a vote.
155. The ethical concerns included “revelations concerning his relationship
with [a] convicted financier.” ABRAHAM, supra note 79, at 10.
156. COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at
130.
157. Id.
158. Congressional concern about ethics was not Haynsworth’s only problem.
He was also seen as a foe of civil rights, demonstrating the reality that a consensus
was forming around Brown. Id. at 171, 171 n.61. See also ABRAHAM, supra note
79, at 11 (noting opposition to Haynsworth due to “allegedly anti-civil libertarian
and anti-civil rights stands”).
159. In the immediate aftermath of Haynsworth’s defeat, some senators were
explicit about their view that previous experience meant that they should at least
make some basic ethics inquiries part of the confirmation process. See, e.g., Cars-
well Hearing, supra note 116, at 28 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Mem-
ber, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking about recusal decisions and noting that the
committee had “gone through . . . in great depth and with substantial impact this
whole question with a previous nominee”); id. at 32–33 (statement of Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that “[t]he most serious
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nominee’s ethics and background as an important part of their job,
and that continues to this day.160  Not every nominee, however, is
subjected to the same amount of questioning about their ethical
background.  Rather, the senators appear to be alert to ethical con-
cerns and are presumably prepared to probe those issues if they
arise.161  Likewise, after Nixon’s next nominee, Judge G. Harold
Carswell of Florida, turned out both to have endorsed white
supremacy as a younger man and to be a mediocre judge at best,162
qualifications and background became and have remained a central
issue for the Committee.
Notable for purposes of this Article, however, is that while eth-
ics and background became a more significant focus of attention
during Period Two, the tenor of the hearings changed in other ways
as well.  Although the segregationists remained on the Judiciary
Committee, they asked only about 27 percent of the questions dur-
ing Period Two, as opposed to nearly 70 percent in Period One.
While individual senators were as likely to assert neutrality at least
once per hearing during the two periods, the overall shift towards a
focus on ethics and the proportional decrease in the participation of
the segregationists meant that the use of the hearings as an oppor-
tunity to complain about the Warren Court largely dissipated.163
Overall, then, there was less emphasis on the “objective” version of
judging that the segregationists pushed during Period One.
The first and last hearings during this period help demonstrate
the contrast with and transition from Period One.  The first hearing
was for Chief Justice Burger, who President Nixon nominated in
1969 to replace Chief Justice Warren.  His hearing occurred in June,
problem we had during the last confirmation proceeding [Haynsworth] was the
question of standards for a judge’s disqualifying himself in certain cases”).
160. The likelihood of a senator asking about ethics and background was
about the same in Period Two as in Period Three, but that likelihood diminished in
Period Four.  There are several possible explanations for that change.  For exam-
ple, post-2000 nominees may have been vetted more extensively by the executive
branch, for example, making such inquiries less necessary by the time the nominee
has his or her hearing.
161. This is evident as much from the numbers of questions asked about eth-
ics and background than the percentage of senators asking.  According to the
Ringhand/Collins database, which those authors shared with me, see supra note
119, Justice Breyer, for example, was asked 144 questions about ethics, while Jus-
tice Ginsburg was asked only 33.  Justice Alito was asked 222, but Chief Justice
Roberts was asked only 91. See also COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS, supra note 15, Appendix (describing coding methodology).
162. ABRAHAM, supra note 79, at 11–12.
163. “By the late 1960s, Brown was widely accepted by the public and em-
braced by constitutional theorists.” COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 171.
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1969, months after Fortas’s ill-fated nomination was withdrawn, and
less than a month after his resignation.  But Burger’s hearing also
occurred before the President nominated Judge Haynsworth to re-
place Justice Fortas.
At Burger’s hearing, unlike the recent Fortas hearing, the Mar-
shall hearing, and numerous others during the post-Brown years,
the segregationist senators did not hold forth on and challenge the
nominees about their views of Brown or the Warren Court.  Sena-
tor Ervin did not ask any questions at all and instead announced his
belief that Burger had already “manifested his devotion to the Con-
stitution and devotion to the law.”164  Senator Thurmond, likewise,
asked no questions and made a statement of support similar to Er-
vin’s.165  And the other previously vocal segregationists engaged
with Burger about judicial philosophy only marginally more, asking
a tiny number of easily-answered questions.166  Overall, these previ-
ously oppositional senators were  pleased with the Burger nomina-
tion—and indeed said so explicitly.
But if the tone of the hearing was different from many of those
that had come before, it was also unlike those that came afterwards.
Unlike the Haynsworth hearings, there were virtually no questions
about Burger’s ethical conduct or about his qualifications.167  By
164. Nomination of Warren E. Burger, of Virginia, to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 7 (1969)
[hereinafter Burger Hearing].
165. Id. at 20 (noting that Burger’s judicial record indicated that he “be-
lieve[d] in a strict construction of the Constitution[,] in interpreting the law but not
legislating, in strong enforcement of the law, in equal treatment for all with favorit-
ism to none, and in preserving the structure of government provided in our
Constitution”).
166. Senator Eastland, the committee chairman, asked if “the Supreme Court
has the power to amend the Constitution . . . through judicial interpretation . . .
[or] to legislate judicial interpretations.” Id. at 5.  Burger said no. Id.  And East-
land asked Burger if as Chief Justice he would “take special care to preserve to the
State and local governments all of the rights, responsibilities, and powers reserved
to them by the Constitution.” Id.  In response, Burger promised to “support and
defend the Constitution.” Id. Senator McClellan, for his part, asked two questions
about “the proper balance between the rights of the accused and society,” and
quoted approvingly from a Burger dissent that declared the courts’ job as “inter-
pret[ing] the laws faithfully as Congress wrote them, not as we think Congress
ought to have provided.”  Id. at 6. See also COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMA-
TION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 171 (describing Burger hearing).
167. One senator asked Burger for “a list of all professional corporations,
business firms or enterprises in which you have been an officer, director, or propri-
etor during the time that you have been on the bench,” and said that he “should
have asked [this] of the last nominee for Chief Justice [Fortas].” Id. at 8 (statement
of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  But the conver-
sation immediately moved on to a more extensive discussion of judicial manage-
ment issues. Id.
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the time of Justice Stevens’s hearing in 1975, however, ethics and
qualifications had become significant concerns.  There were a fair
number of questions about, for example, then-Judge Stevens’s
recusal practices168 and about whether he received income from any
non-judicial sources.169  His health was discussed in some de-
tail170—ironically given that more than 40 years later, Justice Ste-
vens is still with us.171
At Justice Stevens’s hearing, although Senator Eastland re-
mained chairman of the committee, and Senator McClellan and
Senator Thurmond were still members, none of them asked probing
or substantive questions.  Senator Byrd of West Virginia, a former
Ku Klux Klan member, picked up some of the slack, asking, for
example, about Stevens’s “view of the idea that the Constitution
had a fixed and definite meaning when it was adopted and that the
same fixed and definite meaning prevails today but that it must be
applied to changing circumstances and interpreted and construed in
the light of those circumstances.”172  But Byrd’s questioning was
relatively mild and short-lived compared to what Fortas and Mar-
shall had endured.
In response to Byrd, Stevens articulated a view of constitu-
tional adjudication that incorporated the need for judgment.  “The
more fundamental the charter is,” he said,
the more it must, necessarily, contain open areas that require
construction and interpretation.  And to the extent that open ar-
eas remain in our Constitution, and inevitably a large number
do—I must say, I don’t mean to digress too much, but I have
been constantly surprised in my work how many questions have
not yet been decided, statutes, Constitution, all the rest—where
there are open areas, the judge, I think, has the duty, really, to do
two things.  One, to do his best to understand what was intended
in this kind of situation, and yet to realize that our society does
change and to try to decide the case in a context that was not
completely understood and envisioned by those who drafted the
168. Nomination of John Paul Stevens, of Illinois, to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong. 31–32, 36, 70–71 (1975) [hereinafter Stevens Hearing].
169. Id. at 51–52.
170. Id. at 8–12.
171. Then-Judge Stevens pointed out that his “family has a history of longev-
ity” and that his mother was then 94 years old. Id. at 10.  Justice Stevens, of
course, is now 97 years old.  Biography of Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx#JStevens.
172. Stevens Hearing, supra note 168, at 41.
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particular set of rules.  So there is an open area within which the
judge must work.173
But there was very little further discussion of how the judge would
operate in that open area.  Senator Byrd did not press Stevens.174
Period Two ended then, with a much different tone from Period
One.  The tension persisted (as it still does today) between those
who claimed there are objectively correct answers to difficult legal
questions and those who believed that there is often an unavoidable
role for judgment, but those discussions were muted.
C. Period Three:  The Golden Age, 1981–1994
Period Three, during which there were nine Supreme Court
confirmation hearings,175 began with a significant shift in media
coverage.  Starting with Justice O’Connor’s 1981 hearing, the hear-
ings were televised.  And in an undoubtedly related development,
O’Connor’s hearing was also the first at which there was an as-
sumption that every senator would ask questions of the nominee.176
That development alone changed the dynamics of the hearing, be-
cause, unlike in Period One, the questioning was not dominated by
a group of senators who had a particular axe to grind and a particu-
lar claim about how Supreme Court Justices should do their jobs.
And unlike in Period Two, senators asked more substantive
questions.
But it is the fourth of those hearings, for Robert Bork’s failed
nomination, that is widely viewed as seminal—although as dis-
cussed earlier, there is disagreement on precisely what it presaged.
Some decry what they view as the beginning of the overpoliticiza-
tion of the nomination process, as illustrated by Bork’s defeat.177
173. Id. at 42.
174. The other most persistent questioner was Senator Kennedy, who ap-
peared to be concerned that Justice Stevens was too conservative and focused pri-
marily on his views about particular issues, such as gender discrimination, id. at
15–17, and capital punishment, id. at 26–28, and much less on bigger questions of
judicial philosophy.  Stevens declined to answer many of Kennedy’s specific ques-
tions about such issues. See id. at 15–17, 26–28.
175. The nominees were Sandra Day O’Connor (1981), William Rehnquist
(as Chief Justice) (1986), Antonin Scalia (1986), Robert Bork (1987), Anthony M
Kennedy (1987), David H, Souter (1990), Clarence Thomas (1991), Ruth Bader
Ginsburg (1993), and Stephen G. Breyer (1994).
176. See Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona to Serve as
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 59 (1981) [hereinafter O’Connor Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (ex-
plaining that there would be two rounds of 15-minute questioning sessions).
177. See, e.g., Totenberg, Bork’s Nomination, supra note 38.
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Others argue that the nomination demonstrated the proper func-
tioning of the democratic check on lifetime appointments.178  Some
argue that because Bork’s relative candor led to his nomination’s
defeat, subsequent nominees have refused to provide meaningful
information, although Farganis’s and Wedeking’s research suggests
otherwise.179  Regardless of the accuracy of that perception, how-
ever, Bork was more likely than all other nominees combined to
claim neutrality.  Indeed, he did so at least once with almost every
senator (92 percent).  During the 1990s in particular, commentators
were very harsh about the proceedings and the lack of information
the nominees shared, or for that matter, were asked for by the
senators.180
Ironically, however, after Bork, discussions of judicial philoso-
phy intensified, ushering in something of a golden age.  During this
time, nominees and senators on both sides of the political spectrum
acknowledged that there are often not objectively deducible correct
answers to difficult legal questions, and thus—whether implicitly or
explicitly—acknowledged a role for value-laden judgments.
1. Before Bork.
By the time of Justice O’Connor’s hearing, the only remaining
member of the segregationist old-guard still on the Judiciary Com-
mittee was its chair, Strom Thurmond.181  And one of Thurmond’s
first questions indeed echoed the segregationist complaints about
the Warren Court.  “[T]he phrase ‘judicial activism,’” he said, “re-
fers to the practice of the judicial branch substituting its own policy
preferences for those of elected Representatives,” and he asked
then-Judge O’Connor for her views about the proper role of the
courts.182  Not surprisingly, she rejected the notion that judges can
impose their own policy preferences.183
178. See, e.g., COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note
15, at 197, 200; s, supra note 63, at 1221; Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, supra note
63.
179. Farganis & Wedeking, supra note 16, at 527, 540–42.
180. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 925, 941.
181. O’Connor Hearing, supra note 176, at ii.
182. Id. at 60.
183. Then-Judge O’Connor said:
It is the role and function, it seems to me, of the legislative branch to
determine public policy; and it is the role and function of the judicial
branch, in my view, to interpret the enactments of the legislative branch
and to apply them, and insofar as possible to determine any challenges to
the constitutionality of those legislative enactments.  In carrying out the
judicial function, I believe in the exercise of judicial restraint. Id.
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But there was also some acknowledgment, by both O’Connor
and by other senators, that conditions in the world might lead to
new understandings of constitutional provisions—a possibility that
inevitably requires judges to exercise some judgment.  For example,
Senator Arlen Specter noted that the reasoning of Brown rested on
new understandings about the “effect of segregation on public edu-
cation,”184 and asked whether, however “strict a constructionist
[one] may be, there is some latitude appropriately to consider pub-
lic policy or social policy in interpreting the Constitution.”185  Jus-
tice O’Connor agreed, with her caveats focusing primarily on the
importance of the information coming to the Court through brief-
ing rather than the Court “look[ing] outside the record.”186  This
kind of discussion was new to the hearings.
In addition, in 1981, neither Brown nor criminal procedure ju-
risprudence dominated discussions about judicial activism.187  In-
stead, abortion and the appropriateness of Roe v. Wade had
184. Id. at 131.
185. Id. at 132.
186. Id. Initially, however, O’Connor struggled to articulate the nature of the
decision-making in Brown.  Senator Biden suggested that “when in fact the legisla-
tive bodies of this country have failed in their respon[s]ibilities—as they did in the
civil rights area—to react to . . . the change in the mores of the times, and see to it
that that is reflected in the law, on those rare occasions it is proper for the Court to
step in.” Id. at 67 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary). Although O’Connor made clear that she believed Brown was cor-
rectly decided, she took issue with Biden’s explanation. Id.  Instead, she explained
that “the Court ha[d] reached changed results based interpreting a given provision
of the Constitution based on its research of what the true meaning of that provi-
sion is—based on the intent of the framers, its research on the history of that par-
ticular provision.” Id.  See also id. at 84 (articulating this view of Brown in
colloquy with Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 102
(same, with Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  Biden
and others pressed her on this point.  During his second round of questioning, for
example, Biden quoted from Brown, pointing out that her description of what had
happened in that case was inaccurate and that the Court had been explicit that it
was responding to changed “social mores” and not a new historical understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 138.  He continued:
I know you know that, and I know it is difficult for you to respond to that
because as soon as you respond to me you are going to have 14 other men
jumping on you to say something else, so I will not even ask you to an-
swer it, but I hope you know that I know you know.
Id.  By the second day of hearings, O’Connor had come around to agreeing with
Biden, as indicated in the colloquy with Specter discussed above. Id. at 132.
187. It would be inaccurate to say that these issues were completely irrele-
vant.  Sen. Laxalt, for example, asked O’Connor if she thought the exclusionary
rule “may be too narrow, overprotecting the rights of defendants while impeding
the ability of the law enforcement people to enforce the law,” id. at 79, and Sen.
Grassley asked about busing, id. at 119.
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become the focus of such concerns.188  Several senators described
Roe v. Wade as an extraordinarily activist decision,189 and several of
them expressed frustration at O’Connor’s unwillingness to presage
how she might vote in cases involving abortion.190  But even one of
those senators, Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, acknowledged that
the answers to difficult constitutional questions were not necessarily
objectively deducible.  Quoting from a letter from “constitutional
lawyer” William Bentley Ball, he stated:
Philosophy is everything in dealing with the spacious provisions
of the first amendment, the due process clauses, equal protection,
and much else in the Constitution.  It is perfect nonsense to
praise a candidate as a “strict constructionist” when in these vital
areas of the Constitution there is really very little language to
“strictly” construe.191
Similar acknowledgments of the role of judgment in judging—
although a minor part of the colloquies—continued during the two
other pre-Bork hearings—Rehnquist’s hearing to be Chief Justice,
and Scalia’s hearing to fill Rehnquist’s Associate Justice seat.  Prob-
ably because Rehnquist had already been on the Court for 15 years
and his views on many subjects—including his dissenting vote in
Roe itself—were already known, much of his second hearing in-
volved questions about management of the judicial system and the
role of the Chief Justice on the Court.192  But even so, the issue of
the role of judgment arose.  Pressing Rehnquist on the different
standards used to evaluate constitutionality under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, for example, Senator Biden posited “that the ra-
tional basis test as well as the strict scrutiny test were in fact
interpretive judgments made by sitting Justices as to the extent to
188. See, e.g., id. at 107 (statement of Sen. John P. East, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary); id. at 198 (same). Roe was decided in 1973, and after it came
down, only one Period Two nominee—Stevens—was considered.  At Stevens’s
hearing, Roe and abortion barely merited a mention.
189. Id. at 107 (statement of Sen. John P. East, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary); id. at 198 (same).
190. Id. at 249 (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Denton, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
191. O’Connor Hearing, supra note 176, at 249.
192. There were also many questions both about his conduct towards African-
American voters during an election many years earlier and about a memo he had
written while clerking for Justice Jackson stating the view that Plessy v. Ferguson
had been correctly decided and should not be overruled.  Rehnquist maintained
that he had written the memo to express Jackson’s views, not his own, and he was
subjected to significant questioning about that claim.  He did admit, however, that
at the time, he thought that even if Plessy were wrongly decided, there were strong
arguments against overruling. Rehnquist Hearing II, supra note 117, at 85–86,
223–224.
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which the 14th amendment should go,”193 and Rehnquist agreed.194
Even Justice Scalia, testifying the week after Rehnquist, acknowl-
edged that his focus on original meaning could not answer all con-
stitutional questions and that “where the law has to be applied to
circumstances that just did not exist at the time, you obviously have
to decide as a judge what resolution would most comport with the
application of that clause to the circumstances that did exist at the
time and try to make it fit.”195  In both hearings, these elements of
the discussion were minor compared to other issues, but they repre-
sented the beginning of a more accurate description of judging than
the claims of objectivity like those the segregationists had
championed.
2. Bork.
Robert Bork was a judge on the D.C. Circuit when he was
nominated, but he was also a longtime law professor and had writ-
ten and spoken extensively.  He was the first nominee to set forth a
detailed set of theories about the Constitution and how it should be
interpreted.  (Although Justice Scalia became a famous champion
of originalism and textualism, he did not take such strong positions
at his hearing.)196  Bork’s theories, and his writings and speeches,
became the centerpiece of his hearing, as senators pushed him to
explain what many considered his extreme views about the
Constitution.
Bork believed that recognizing one person’s constitutional
rights necessarily reduced the rights of others because it prevented
those others from enacting laws or otherwise behaving in ways that
infringed on the newly recognized right197—a kind of “zero-sum”
Constitution.198  Indeed, he agreed, when asked, that “if you give
slaves freedom . . .  you then take away the freedom of slave own-
193. Id. at 355.
194. Id. (“No question about it.”).
195. Scalia Hearing, supra note 91, at 109.
196. Scalia explained that he did not have “a fully framed omnibus view of
the Constitution,” although he did not like the term “living Constitution.” Id. at
48, 49.  He went on:  “What I think is that the Constitution is obviously not meant
to be evolvable so easily that in effect a court of nine judges can treat it as though
it is a bring-along-with-me statute and fill it up with whatever content the current
times seem to require.” Id. at 48.
197. Bork Hearing, supra note 90, at 313 (colloquy with Sen. Paul Simon,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
198. Linda Greenhouse, A Time to Choose for the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/opinion/a-time-to-
choose-for-the-supreme-court.html?_r=0.
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ers.”199  As a result, he claimed it was necessary to hew narrowly to
the Constitution’s language and original intent, and in language that
echoed some of the segregationists’ criticisms of the Warren Court,
he condemned the use of the Due Process Clause as something
“free-floating” the Court “makes [ ] up.”200  Bork did not believe,
for example, that a court should recognize a constitutional right to
marital privacy in the absence of a constitutional provision clearly
protecting that privacy.201
But Bork did not deny a role for judgment.  Repeatedly, in
fact, he described judicial decision-making that had no objectively
deducible answer.  He explored factors that would lead him to set
aside stare decisis and overrule a case;202 he suggested that even
without intermediate scrutiny, “as culture changes and as the posi-
tion of women in society changes,” many restrictions on women
that “seemed reasonable now seem outmoded stereotypes and they
seem unreasonable . . . .”203
Nonetheless, many senators challenged Bork’s approach to
constitutional interpretation, and in doing so, made statements that
implicitly promoted—and publicized, in a televised hearing that
went on for days—a view of constitutional adjudication that re-
quires judges to apply broadly-worded constitutional provisions to
new situations or in light of new understandings about the world
that the Framers might never have imagined.  During an early dis-
cussion, for example, Senator Biden pressed Bork to explain why
he did not believe that Griswold’s holding—that married couples
could not constitutionally be denied access to birth control—could
be justified.204  Similarly, Senator Kennedy asked him to explain
why he had argued that heightened scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause should not apply to gender discrimination.205  These
lines of questioning implied the appropriate use of judgment in de-
fining the scope of constitutional rights—a broader use of judgment
than Bork was willing to accede to.
199. Bork Hearing, supra note 90, at 313 (describing freeing slaves as “a redis-
tribution of liberties, commanded by the 13th amendment” and promising that “I
certainly have no objection to a redistribution of liberties whenever the Constitu-
tion requires or authorizes it”).
200. Id. at 315.
201. Id. at 114–21.
202. Id. at 128–29.
203. Id. at 161.
204. Id. at 114–21.  Bork argued that he had restricted his criticism to the
reasoning of Griswold, not its result, and that although he did not know of a consti-
tutional argument in support of its holding, he had not concluded that none could
possibly exist. Id.
205. Id. at 159–61.
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3. Post-Bork.
Substantive questioning of, and discussion by, subsequent
nominees continued after Bork’s nomination was defeated,206 and it
is worth examining the hearing immediately following his—Justice
Kennedy’s—in some detail.  During that hearing, which took place
at the end of 1987, only a few months after Bork’s nomination
failed, Kennedy, along with numerous senators, repeatedly de-
scribed the judicial role as requiring judgment.  Early on, for exam-
ple, Senator Biden, by then the chair of the Committee, explained
that he was going to start his questioning “with the unenumerated
rights question, which occupied a great deal of our time in the . . .
prior hearing with Judge Bork.”207  More specifically, Biden asked
Kennedy about his previous description of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ liberty guarantee as “a spacious phrase.”208  Ken-
nedy explained that “the words of the Constitution must be the be-
ginning of our inquiry,” but he went on to describe a “line that is
drawn where the individual can tell the Government: Beyond this
line you may not go.”209  Moreover, he added, that line “is waver-
ing; it is amorphous; it is uncertain.  But this is the judicial func-
tion.”210  Kennedy thus explicitly embraced a “judicial function”
that encompasses questions of judgment,211 and he and Senator
Biden went on to discuss the second Justice Harlan’s statement that
206. Ringhand & Collins, May It Please the Senate, supra note 15, at 597–98.
207. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 85 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearing]. See also id. at 117 (state-
ment of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary noting that
“fundamental disagreement” about the Equal Protection Clause that emerged dur-
ing the Bork hearing).
208. Id. at 85.
209. Id. at 86.
210. Id. See also id. at 122 (statement of then-Judge Kennedy noting, in
agreement with Sen. DeConcini, that “the enforcement power of the judiciary is to
insure that the word liberty in the Constitution is given its full and necessary mean-
ing, consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it”); id. at 134
(statement of then-Judge Kennedy noting that “the Court is struggling with [the
tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause] on a
case-by-case basis”).   Then-Judge Kennedy also stated:
I do not have an over-arching theory, a unitary theory of interpretation.  I
am searching, as I think many judges are, for the correct balance in con-
stitutional interpretation.  So many of the things we are discussing here
are, for me, in the nature of exploration and not the enunciation of some
fixed or immutable ideas. Id. at 154.
211. This view of the judicial function, in particular with respect to the scope
of constitutional protections for privacy, recurred in Kennedy’s testimony. See,
e.g., id. at 166 (statement of then-Judge Kennedy noting that “with reference to the
right of privacy, we are very much in a stage of evolution and debate” and that
“the public and the legislature have every right to participate”); id. at 176 (“The
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“no formula could serve as a substitute in this area for judgment
and restraint, and that there were not any ‘mechanical yardsticks’
or ‘mechanical answers.’”212  In other words, Kennedy embraced an
approach to determining the scope of constitutional protections
that is both contingent and value-laden, albeit not boundless.
Biden and Kennedy’s colloquy set the tone for Kennedy’s two
days of testimony.  In a subsequent discussion with Senator
Grassley, for example, Kennedy resisted embracing original intent
as a methodology that “tell[s] us how to decide a case,” and instead
described a more nuanced analysis in which determining the Fram-
ers’ “[i]ntention . . . is one of the objectives of our inquiry.  If we
know what the framers intended in the broad sense . . . then we
have a key to the meaning of the document.”213  Nor did Kennedy
and the senators limit their acknowledgment of the role of judg-
ment to constitutional law.  In colloquy with Senator Thurmond, for
example, Kennedy described the factors that the Supreme Court
should take into account in deciding who should be able to recover
in an antitrust lawsuit.214  That the Court might have to make diffi-
cult judgments in doing so was apparently uncontroversial to both
the senator and the nominee.215
Subsequent nominees likewise spoke of the values and judg-
ments involved in judging, sometimes explicitly and sometimes by
implication.  But all of the remaining nominees in this period pro-
vided insight into their judicial philosophies and the type of inquir-
ies they think are necessary for answering difficult constitutional
questions.  Justice Souter, for example, offered a fairly substantive
law accommodates a certain amount of contradiction and duality while it is in a
state of growth.”).
212. Id. at 86.  At the same time, Kennedy repeatedly rejected the notion that
a judge could simply impose his views of what was just on the country. See, e.g., id.
at 155.  The judicial role, in his view, was a constrained one.  It was, nonetheless, so
different from Bork’s view that Ringhand and Collins describe “read[ing] the tran-
scripts of these hearings back-to-back . . . is like time traveling from one era into
another.” COLLINS & RINGHAND, CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 15, at
221.
213. Kennedy Hearing, supra note 210. at 140.  Some senators thought that
Kennedy relied too much on original intent.  In an extended colloquy between
Kennedy and Sen. Arlen Specter, id. at 148–53, for example, Specter argued that
the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not support
the outcome in Brown v. Board of Education and thus argued for a more
“realis[t]” approach to constitutional adjudication. Id. at 153.  Nothing like this
discussion had occurred in any hearing before Bork.
214. Id. at 95.
215. See id. at 113 (statement of then-Judge Kennedy explaining courts should
take a “pragmatic” and “workable” approach to protection of constitutional rights
in criminal justice system); id. at 117–20 (agreeing that different approaches to
Equal Protection Clause scrutiny may be valid).
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description of his approach to unenumerated constitutional rights,
pointing to the need for “a broader inquiry into the history and
traditions of the American people as being the basis upon which a
fundamental valuation or a finding of no fundamental valuation
should rest.”216  This hearing testimony not only is remarkably con-
sistent with Justice Souter’s subsequent jurisprudence on substan-
tive due process,217 but it is explicit that the appropriate judicial
inquiry sometimes involves making judgments about American tra-
ditions and values.
Justice Souter also addressed the Warren Court’s criminal pro-
cedure jurisprudence, and he did not condemn it.  He explained, for
example, that the Court in Miranda engaged in what he viewed as
appropriate pragmatic experimentation, attempting to solve the ju-
dicial system’s problem of having to adjudicate a large number of
unwieldy case-by-case claims about involuntary confessions.218
Under those circumstances, Souter explained, the Court acted ap-
propriately.  This pragmatic approach recognizes a role for the
judge’s exercise of judgment.
Justice Thomas, unlike Justice Souter, had a record of public
positions, including numerous speeches.  Because he had often spo-
ken about the importance of natural law to the Founders, the sena-
tors questioned him extensively about his view of natural law in
constitutional interpretation.  Although he repeatedly denied that
natural law would play a direct role in his constitutional adjudica-
tion, then-Judge Thomas explained that natural law was important
as a way to understand what the Founders were thinking, and that
one important source of information was the description of natural
law set out in the Declaration of Independence.219  Thomas even
harshly criticized Justice Holmes for his refusal to consider the Dec-
laration in his jurisprudence.220
Justice Ginsburg similarly had a lengthy public record as a
scholar and activist, and she discussed the specifics of issues and
cases that she had been involved in or had written about.  But she
also talked more generally about her belief in the way the Constitu-
216. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 232 (1990) [hereinafter Souter Hearing].
217. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
218. Souter Hearing, supra note 219, at 64.
219. See, e.g., Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102nd Cong. 168 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearing].
220. Id. at 472.
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tion should be interpreted.  Like other nominees, she explained that
what the Constitution meant at the Founding (even assuming it
could be determined) was not necessarily enough, and that constitu-
tional interpretation required identifying the broader principles of
the document and determining how to apply them:
[In] trying to divine what the Framers intended, I must look at
that matter two ways.  One is what they might have intended im-
mediately for their day, and the other is their large expectation
that the Constitution would govern, as Cardozo said, not for the
passing hour, but for the expanding future.221
Ginsburg went on to provide a specific example:  “Thomas Jef-
ferson said: ‘Were our state a pure democracy, there still would be
excluded from our deliberations women who, to prevent deprava-
tion in morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscu-
ously in the gatherings of men.’  Nonetheless,” Justice Ginsburg
argued, “I do believe that Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today,
would say that women are equal citizens.”222  Indeed, Justice Gins-
burg’s career of successfully bringing sex discrimination cases to the
Supreme Court, as well her position on Roe,223 was grounded in an
understanding of women as equal citizens that would not have been
familiar to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, much less to
Thomas Jefferson.  Developing a constitutional jurisprudence of
gender equality thus requires judges to make value-laden judg-
ments about the scope and meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Breyer’s testimony also, from the beginning, reflected
his commitment to a well-functioning and democratically accounta-
ble government.  Discussing the tension between constitutional pro-
tections of property and the need for health and safety regulation,
for example, he argued that courts should seek “a practical accom-
modation.  Of course, there is a compensation clause in the Consti-
tution.  Of course, property is given some protection.  At the same
221. Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 88, at 127.
222. Id.
223. Justice Ginsburg had written about Roe, and gave a more candidly sup-
portive answer than many nominees, although she was skeptical of substantive due
process as the source of reproductive rights.  In response to one senator, she
explained:
[Y]ou asked me my thinking on equal protection versus individual auton-
omy.  My answer is that both are implicated.  The decision whether or not
to bear a child is central to a woman’s life, to her well-being and dignity.
It is a decision she must make for herself.  When Government controls
that decision for her, she is being treated as less than a fully adult human
responsible for her own choices.
Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 88, at 207.
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time, one must not go too far, and what too far means is imposing
significant practical obstacles.”224  And while agreeing with Senator
Hatch that “a judge’s authority derives entirely from the fact that
he or she is applying the law, not simply imposing his or her policy
preferences,”225 Breyer also emphasized that the law may not pro-
vide objectively correct answers.  “[I]t is difficult . . . [because] peo-
ple disagree, often, about how, in vast, uncertain, open areas of law,
where there are such good arguments on both sides of such impor-
tant policy issues, of course people disagree about what the proper
outcome of those issues is.”226  Breyer did not suggest, however,
that a judge could simply impose what he viewed as the best policy.
Instead, “the judge follows canons, practices, rules, cases, proce-
dures, all those things that help define the role of the judge,”227 and
is “bound by the words, the history, the precedents, the traditions,
all of those things which in fact go up to make this great body of
institutions, including legal advice and how businesses and labor un-
ions interpret it and so forth, that we call law.”228
***
There is much to criticize about the conduct of confirmation
hearings during this period.  Certainly, senators and citizens alike
have wanted substantially more information than most nominees
have been willing to provide.  But the caricature of nominees who
simply refused to answer questions is, for the most part, inaccu-
rate.229  Indeed, particularly in the post-Bork era, the hearings
clearly revealed ways the nominees were in fact different from one
another.  They had different and fairly well-thought-out approaches
to the project of judging.  As a result, the commitments they made
to impartiality, open-mindedness, and appropriate judicial restraint
could not be confused with claims that in their role they would be
doing no more than deducing the logically and objectively correct
result from legal sources.
224. Breyer Hearing, supra note 81, at 115.
225. Id. at 119.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 120.
228. Id. at 119.
229. There were some exceptions.  Then-Judge Scalia, who denied having an
overarching judicial philosophy, was particularly close-lipped.  Senator Biden, for
example, expressed significant frustration with his refusal to answer questions
about his position on even the most well-established and venerated precedents.
See Scalia Hearing, supra note 91, at 47–53.
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C. Period Four:  The Age of the Umpire, 2005–2017
Nominees in the new millennium have taken a different ap-
proach.  Rather than describe their judicial philosophies, even in
general terms, they have, for the most part, promised to reach judi-
cial conclusions solely by reference to “law,” as if the (uncontrover-
sial) sources the nominees say they will look to—the text of the
Constitution, statutory language, precedent—contain clear answers
if only they look hard enough.  This rhetoric hearkens back to the
Warren Court hearings.  But the senators who used such language
in the 1950s and 1960s had very specific and well-known views
about the legally right and wrong answers—Brown was wrong and
the Warren Court criminal procedure jurisprudence overreached.
Contemporary nominees, on the other hand, focus largely on
mechanics and legal sources and some even deny a role for judg-
ment at all.230
Most famously, Chief Justice Roberts invoked claims of con-
straint and objectivity, with his now well-known umpire meta-
phor,231 and he also invoked the legal sources he claimed he would
rely on exclusively:
We don’t turn a matter over to a judge because we want his view
about what the best idea is, what the best solution is.  It’s because
we want him or her to apply the law.  They are constrained when
they do that.  They are constrained by the words that you choose
to enact into law in interpreting the law.  They are constrained by
the words of the Constitution.  They are constrained by the
precedents of other judges that become part of the rule of law
that they must apply.232
He also spoke of modesty and restraint, explaining, for example,
that “[j]udges need to appreciate that the legitimacy of their action
is confined to interpreting the law and not making it.”233  And not
only could all of these statements have been uttered by any other
nominee, Roberts added little else.  In other words, rather than
describing a human enterprise requiring both discretion and con-
230. Many overlapping possibilities exist as to why the rhetoric shifted in the
post-2000 era, including increased political polarization, a desire by nominees to
portray the Court as a non-ideological institution in the wake of Bush v. Gore, and
the increased threat of the filibuster. See Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality, supra note
121, at 465 n.50 (citing Stone, supra note 44, at 447-52); id. at 469.
231. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 55–56.
232. Id. at 177. See also id. at 159 (colloquy with Sen. Hatch) (noting that
some of the Constitution’s broad phrases are not self-defining so a judge must look
to “the cases and the precedents [and] what the Framers had in mind when they
drafted that provision”).
233. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 353.
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straint, he described an occasionally imperfect but largely objective
process.
Justice Alito likewise repeatedly described the importance of
judicial restraint and the need for judges to guard against injecting
their personal views into their work.  In so doing, he emphasized
the importance of “objective” sources of information:
[J]udges have to look to objective things, and if it’s a question of
absolutely first impression . . . you would look to the text of the
Constitution and you would look to anything that would shed
light on the way in which the provision would have been under-
stood by people reading it at the time.
You certainly would look to precedent, which is an objective
factor, and most of the issues that come up in constitutional law
now fall within an area in which there is a rich and often very
complex body of doctrine that has worked out.  Search and
seizure is an example.  Most of the issues that arise concerning
freedom of speech is another example.  There is a whole body of
doctrine dealing with that, and that’s objective and you would
look to that and you would reason by analogy from the prece-
dents that are in existence.234
Justice Sotomayor’s testimony was remarkably similar to Rob-
erts’s and Alito’s.  In her opening statement, for example, Justice
Sotomayor described her “judicial philosophy [as s]imple: fidelity to
the law.  The task of a judge is not to make law, it is to apply the
law.”235  More specifically, she explained repeatedly that judging in-
volves looking closely at the facts, looking closely at the relevant
legal materials, and drawing a logical conclusion from those
sources:
I don’t judge on the basis of ideology.  I judge on the basis of law
and my reasoning . . . When my colleagues and I [on the Circuit
Court], in many cases, have initially come to disagreeing posi-
tions, we’ve discussed them and either persuaded each other,
changed each other’s minds, and worked from the starting point
of arguing, discussing, exchanging perspectives on what the law
commands.236
In fact, it is surprisingly difficult to identify which passages come
from Alito’s hearing and which from Sotomayor’s.
These three post-2000 nominees did acknowledge that judging
is not a mechanical process.  Chief Justice Roberts, for example,
234. Alito Hearing, supra note 119, at 357.
235. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 81, at 59.
236. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 81, at 437.
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pointed out that when Congress has “deliberately or inadvertently
[left questions] unanswered” in a statute, courts have no choice but
to resolve those questions.237  And he acknowledged other areas
where the legal sources do not yield a logically deducible answer,
such as the challenge of applying the Bill of Rights in wartime or
the scope of the right of privacy under the Constitution, but without
providing any insight into the approach he would take to answering
those questions beyond an uncontroversial list of sources he would
look to.238
For her part, Justice Kagan repeatedly returned to the expres-
sion “it’s law all the way down” to describe the proper approach to
judicial decision-making, and she elaborated on that idea several
times during her hearings.239  Although she acknowledged that
there are sometimes clashes of constitutional provisions that may
require “judgment” and “wisdom” to resolve, she provided no
sense of what the content of that judgment or wisdom might look
like.240
And Judge Gorsuch’s conduct was, if anything, even more ex-
treme than that of any of the other recent nominees, as the descrip-
tion of his testimony in the Introduction demonstrates.  He resisted
expressing views on venerable cases like Griswold and, to a lesser
extent, even Brown, simply calling them “decision[s] of the United
States Supreme Court,” and thus, “the law.”241  And he said that
principles of stare decisis themselves are also “the law,”242 but
would not discuss how he might take into account any particular
principle such as reliance interests.243  He disavowed having a view
about the constitutionality and viability of Chevron,244 despite hav-
ing argued in an unnecessary separate opinion that it is a “behe-
237. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 179. See also Sotomayor Hearing,
supra note 81, at 437.
238. See, e.g., Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 241 (explaining in a discus-
sion about civil liberties after September 11, 2001, that although the Bill of Rights
itself does not change, “[t]here may be situations where demands are different and
they have to be analyzed appropriately so that things that might have been accept-
able in times of war are not acceptable in times of peace”); id. at 259–60 (discuss-
ing the right of privacy). See also id. at 298 (explaining that terms like “due
process” and “equal protection” were written broadly because they were intended
to apply for generations); id. at 304-05 (discussing balancing of interests in First
Amendment challenges).
239. Kagan Hearing, supra note 11, at 103, 160, 173, 203, 299.
240. Id. at 203.
241. Gorsuch Hearing 3/22/17, supra note 19, at 72-74.
242. Gorsuch Hearing 3/21/17, supra note 9, at 135.
243. Gorsuch Hearing 3/22/17, supra note 19, at 73-74.
244. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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moth” that allows “executive bureaucracies to swallow huge
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate fed-
eral power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square
with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”245  Instead of admit-
ting that his originalism led him to have concerns about the size and
scope of the administrative state, even if he had no conclusion
about whether Chevron should actually be overruled, he simply
promised not to “prejudge” the issue and to come at it “with an
open mind.”246
At the same time that the post-2000 nominees refused to en-
gage in any meaningful discussion of judicial philosophy, the sena-
tors, particularly Republican senators, also used language that
hearkened back to the rhetoric of the hearings during the Warren
Court years.  Chief Justice Roberts and Senator Hatch, for exam-
ple, had an extended discussion about the importance of a judge
interpreting the law, not making it.  Indeed, at the beginning of this
colloquy, Senator Hatch echoed Senator Ervin’s question to Justice
Harlan, asking Roberts if he believed that “unelected judges”
should “us[e] the Constitution to effect cultural and political re-
form, or does the Constitution require that this be left to the people
and their elected representatives?”247  Senator Sessions, then the
ranking Republican on the committee, likewise began his question-
ing of Justice Sotomayor by raising repeated concerns about
whether she believed that “judges do not make law, or [alterna-
tively], that there is no real law.”248
There is only one correct answer to such questions.  But just as
during the 1950s and 1960s, these questions are not motivated by
245. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring).
246. Gorsuch Hearing 3/21/17, supra note 9, at 87.
247. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 161. See also id. at 238 (statement of
Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[W]ouldn’t you agree a
judge should never make an opinion that is beyond what a fair interpretation of
the Constitution would call for?”). Senator Jon Kyl stated:
One of the things that appeals to me from your approach to the law is
that it appears to be a very traditional approach, which is that I am not
sent there to make law, I am sent there to take whatever case comes
before us and just decide the case . . . you have totally eschewed ideology
here, saying that your own personal views or ideology do not have a place
in your decisionmaking.
Id. at 333 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. On the Judiciary. See
also id. at 353 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary) (“I frankly believe that one thing that causes divisiveness and frustration and
angst is when the Supreme Court were to render an opinion that really is more a
political or social policy decision rather than a legal decision.”).
248. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 81, at 70.
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abstract inquiries into separation of powers.  They are predicated
on an assumption that certain cases, whether Brown or Roe, have
crossed the line into illegitimate “cultural and political reform.”
Occasionally, the connection is even explicit.  During the Roberts
hearing, for example, Senator Brownback explained that “President
[Bush]’s lead applause line the last election cycle, was ‘I will ap-
point judges who will be judges, not legislators.’  That it is an ap-
plause line at a political rally should say something about people’s
angst towards what the courts have done, and particularly when it
comes to this issue of abortion.”249  In other words, for some on the
right, references to making, not applying law, or to the proper role
of the Court, presupposes that some results are so wrong as to be
illegitimate.
IV. NEUTRALITY AND LEGITIMACY
The historical shifts in confirmation hearing rhetoric is interest-
ing in and of itself, but it may also have consequences for the Court
and the country.  Among other things, the renewed emphasis on a
rhetoric of neutrality and objectivity—and its increased embrace by
the nominees themselves without any leavening discussion of judi-
cial philosophy—could harm the Court’s legitimacy.250
A. Claimed Neutrality and Cultural Cognition
Just as many decisions of the Supreme Court matter to the
public, so too does the public’s view of the Court matter to it.  As
many people—scholars and judges alike—have explained, the Su-
preme Court itself has no ability to enforce its judgments.  It has no
army, no power of the purse.  Its opinions are enforced as law by
other branches of government and those branches are more directly
accountable democratically.  As a result, it is critical that the Court
maintain its legitimacy with the American people.  The Court can
retain its authority only so long as the people give it that respect.
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that inaccurate claims
of neutral principles actually have the potential to diminish the
Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  This evidence, also in-
ferential, arises from work being done by a team of researchers led
by Professor Dan Kahan.  These researchers explore the way that
249. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 289. See also id. at 332 (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (referring to Sen. Brownback’s
comments with approval).
250. I do not want to overstate my case here; I do not claim that there is at
this time a measurable decline in legitimacy attributable to this shift in the lan-
guage of neutrality.
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cultural cognition influences the way people evaluate empirical evi-
dence in legally salient situations.251  Cultural cognition “is a form
of motivated reasoning through which individuals’ group affiliations
and social commitments color the conclusions they draw from em-
pirical evidence.”252  For example, when asked to determine
whether a video-taped protest involved constitutionally protected
speech or crossed the line into unprotected conduct, individuals’ re-
sponses varied predictably and systematically based on those values
and affiliations on the one hand, and on the other hand, whether
they were told that the protest involved abortion protesters outside
a clinic or gay rights protesters objecting to “don’t ask don’t tell”
outside a college placement facility where the military was inter-
viewing students.253
In addition, people are good at seeing how differing
worldviews can affect people’s perceptions and evaluations of
events when it comes to people they disagree with, while remaining
relatively unaware of this reality in themselves and those they tend
to agree with.  Kahan and others call this phenomenon “naı¨ve real-
ism.”  People are realistic when it comes to the way others’
thoughts and conclusions are influenced by their values and com-
mitments, but surprisingly naı¨ve about themselves.254  As a result,
people often fail to credit the good faith of those with whom they
disagree.255  This feature of cultural cognition can cause humiliation
among the losers in political conflicts, who may feel that their
worldviews have been denigrated, and it can cause or exacerbate
social division.
Kahan has explored how cultural cognition could shape public
responses to the Supreme Court.
251. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiber-
alism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Whose Eyes]; Dan
Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012) [hereinafter Kahan, et al., Protest].
252. Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality, supra note 121, at 470; see also Kahan et
al., Protest, supra note 254, at 853, 859.
253. Kahan et al., Protest, supra note 254, at 863-64, 869-73 (explaining the
experimental conditions); id. at 877-80 (explaining the results).  The video actually
depicted a protest by the Westboro Baptist Church and a counterprotest, but in the
video they looked like a single protest. Id. at 872.  The words on all of the signs
were blurred so that the study participants could not read them, and a generic
sound track was added. Id.
254. Id. at 860. See also Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality, supra note 121, at 469-
70 (discussing cultural cognition).
255. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Prin-
ciples, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan, Foreword].
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As in other arenas, he says, people are likely to believe that the
Justices with whom they agree are reaching carefully considered
results, while those with whom they disagree are allowing their
ideological views to dictate their conclusions.  Particularly be-
cause the Supreme Court often decides cases on controversial
and high-profile issues like abortion and gay rights, these reac-
tions carry with them the threat of de-legitimizing the Court in
the public’s eyes.256
Kahan also argues that the neutral, authoritative voice of the
classic judicial opinion may actually exacerbate this problem be-
cause a posture of neutrality can trigger skepticism among those
who disagree.257  Instead, Kahan argues, the Justices should explic-
itly acknowledge the complexity and value-laden nature of many of
the decisions they make, thus acknowledging that law and legal rea-
soning alone may not provide a path to a single “right” answer.
This recognition of the inherently indeterminate nature of many of
the issues confronted by the Court, which Kahan calls aporia, would
not of course erase social divisions and disagreements.  But it
would, he argues, allow those on the losing side to feel that their
position was actually considered, which might well help prevent
erosion of the Court’s legitimacy.258
Concern for the Court’s legitimacy is not purely hypothetical.
Although the American people’s approval of the Supreme Court is
consistently higher than their approval of the other branches of
government, the Supreme Court’s overall approval ratings have de-
creased steadily over time, along with the approval ratings of the
other branches of government.259  And there is disagreement about
the robustness of the Court’s legitimacy.  In a poll taken in the days
after the Court announced its ruling on the Affordable Care Act in
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,260 Ras-
256. Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality, supra note 121, at 470-71 (describing
Foreword).
257. Kahan, Foreword, supra note 258, at 28-29.
258. Kahan, Foreword, supra note 258, at 62-63. See also Tom Tyler and Mar-
garet Krochik, Deference to Authority as a Basis for Managing Ideological Conflict,
88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 433, 449 (2013) (finding that individuals are more likely to
accept adverse policy outcomes if they believe that their values or concerns were
considered); Dan Simon and Nicholas Scurich, Judicial Overstating, 88 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 411, 429 (2013) (finding that in experimental settings, “lay participants
seem to prefer [judicial] decisions that admit to complexity and open-endedness of
the legal issue over ones that only acknowledge the strength of the winning side”).
259. See, e.g., Supreme Court’s Image Declines as Nomination Battle Looms,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER: U.S. POLITICS & POL’Y (June 15, 2005), http://www.peo
ple-press.org/2005/06/15/supreme-courts-image-declines-as-nomination-battle-
looms/.
260. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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mussen Polling found that 28 percent of respondents rated the
Court as “poor,” an 11 percent increase from the week before the
case was announced.261  During the same time period, the percent-
age of people rating the Court as “good” or “excellent” dropped
from 36 percent to 33 percent.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, those shifts
had a decidedly partisan character.  Republicans went from a 42 to
14 positive view of the Court to 20 to 43; Democrats shifted in the
opposite direction.262  Perhaps more alarming is a poll taken before
the ACA decision was announced that found “a majority of respon-
dents expressed concern that ‘the Supreme Court makes decisions
based on a political agenda instead of the law,’ with only eleven
percent of respondents expressing ‘a great deal of confidence that
the Supreme Court puts politics aside and makes decisions based on
the law.’”263
It is not only the Court’s decisions that have the potential to
affect its image among the people, however.  It is also the confirma-
tion process.  Indeed, the public follows Supreme Court nomina-
tions and confirmation hearings with surprising attentiveness.
James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira found, for example, that 51.9
percent of their survey respondents followed the Alito confirmation
process “either very or somewhat closely” and only 22.2 percent
said that “they paid relatively little attention to the process.”264
Presidential candidates frequently talk about the types of Justices
they would appoint if elected, as both Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton did during the 2016 election, and activist groups try, with
varying degrees of success, to make Supreme Court nominations
campaign issues.265  And confirmation hearings are, quite literally,
the only substantive aspect of the business of the Supreme Court to
be televised.
261. Brett LoGiurato, POLL: The Supreme Court’s Approval Rating Plunges
After The Obamacare Decision, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 1, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/supreme-court-approval-obamacare-decision-ruling-
health-care-2012-7.
262. A similar pattern was observed in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore.  Al-
though the Court’s overall approval ratings remained somewhat stable, that top-
line number masks significant movement away from the Court by Democrats and
towards the Court by Republicans.
263. Pam Karlan, Supreme Court 2011 Term – Foreword: Democracy and Dis-
dain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 n.34 (2012) (quoting Memorandum from Geoff Garin
et al., Hart Research Assocs., to Alliance for Justice, Views of the Supreme Court
on Eve of the Health Care Ruling (June 11, 2012)), available at http://www.afj.org/
connect-with-the-issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/hart-afj-scotus-attitudes.pdf).
264. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, supra note 49, at 71.
265. TREVOR PARRY-GILES, THE CHARACTER OF JUSTICE: RHETORIC, LAW,
AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION PROCESS 116-17 (2006)
(describing role of judicial nominations in the 1980 presidential campaign).
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Moreover, there is evidence that rhetoric about what happens
during confirmation hearings can negatively affect the public’s view
of the Court.  For people who were exposed to ads about then-
Judge Alito—ads which, regardless of whether they supported or
opposed him, uniformly emphasized Judge Alito’s ideology as if he
were a political candidate266—their overall respect for the Court
diminished.267  And this effect was present regardless of whether
the respondents themselves supported Alito.  In other words, the
portrayal of a potential Justice as a nakedly ideological actor dimin-
ished the Court’s public support.268
These findings might be taken to suggest that claims of neutral
principles during the confirmation hearings in fact help to support
the Court’s legitimacy.  The evidence to the contrary is more infer-
ential.  First, Gibson and Caldeira found that their respondents ac-
tually had fairly subtle understandings of the role of ideology in the
work of the Court.  Respondents, by large margins, rejected the
idea that a Supreme Court Justice should “give my ideology a
voice,” and overwhelmingly rejected the notion that a Justice
should “base decisions on party affiliations.”269  On the other hand,
respondents who exhibited relatively high levels of “institutional
loyalty” also indicated support for the notion that the nominee
should exercise some discretion, without being overtly partisan or
wildly ideological, an attribute that Gibson and Caldeira label
“judiciousness.”270
These findings forced an interesting shift in Gibson and
Caldeira’s own understanding of the effects of institutional loyalty
and knowledge of democratic institutions.  Rather than arguing (as
they and other political scientists have in the past) that increased
loyalty is consistent with the “myth of legality”—the belief that
judging is entirely neutral—loyalty to the institution appears to be
tied to a more nuanced understanding of the Court and its role.271
Gibson and Caldeira concluded that:
[T]he American people might indeed be willing to recognize dis-
cretion in judicial decisionmaking—even accepting the inevitabil-
ity that judges must make the law, not just interpret it—without
threats to the legitimacy of courts.  So long as the exercise of dis-
266. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, supra note 49, at 107.
267. Id. at 112.
268. Gibson and Caldeira do not know if this effect dissipates and if so, how
quickly. Id. at 120.
269. Id. at 81.
270. Id. at 90-91.
271. Id.
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cretion is principled (and, we suspect, grounded in concepts such
as fairness and justice, the very important complements to legal-
ity), people may accept it as legitimate.272
And indeed, subsequent research has borne out that intuition.  For
example, Gibson and Caldeira found, in a survey of a representa-
tive nationwide sample, that “the American people seem to accept
that judicial decisionmaking can be discretionary and grounded in
ideologies, but also principled and sincere.”273  In other words, this
research supports the intuition that acknowledging aporia can en-
hance, rather than undermine, the Court’s legitimacy.
All of this has implications for Supreme Court confirmation
hearings and the way they are conducted.  Just as the “neutral” ju-
dicial voice might trigger naı¨ve realism and its consequent social
division, so too might the repeated invocations of neutrality, dis-
avowals of ideology, and claims that the Court only follows or inter-
prets the law, but never makes it.  The disconnect between these
claims and the reality of what people observe once decisions are
made can worsen what Kahan calls (perhaps prematurely) the
Court’s “neutrality crisis.”
B. Neutrality and Partisanship
The effects of the ritual claims of neutrality, of following-not-
making-law, of decrying activism, are not themselves ideologically
neutral, despite the fact that nominees of both parties embrace
them.  The words “strict constructionist,” for example, can sound
neutral; indeed, it could (possibly) describe the approach to judging
that Justice Sotomayor articulated—looking carefully and deeply at
the legal materials and factual record and deducing the correct legal
answer.  But the term “strict constructionist” also has a different
connotation, at least to those in the know.  As Rehnquist himself
explained in an internal Nixon Administration memo:  “[a] judge
who is a ‘strict constructionist’ in constitutional matters will gener-
ally not be favorably inclined toward claims of either criminal de-
fendants or civil rights plaintiffs—the latter two groups having been
272. Id. at 91 n.20.
273. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged
the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 195, 214 (2011)
[hereinafter Gibson & Caldeira, Legal Realism].  Even more recently, Gibson and
another co-author have found that Americans’ views of the Supreme Court are
negatively affected by what they perceive as the politicization of the Court, which
is distinct from the appropriate role of principled discretion.  James L. Gibson &
Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory: What Roles do Politicization,
Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court
Legitimacy?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 592, 612–13 (2017).
2018] THE LANGUAGE OF NEUTRALITY 643
the principal beneficiaries of the Supreme Court’s ‘broad construc-
tionist’ reading of the Constitution.”274
So when conservative senators, conservative nominees like
Bork and Gorsuch, and conservative Justices like Scalia all claim
that their jurisprudential approaches are neutral and prevent the
illegitimate use of the Justice’s personal policy preferences, such
questions and claims about neutrality, then, are signals, like other
types of signals that Kahan and his co-authors discuss.  For some
groups of people, these claims signal a particular set of values and
approaches to the kinds of questions that the court will decide—as
Senator Brownback made clear when he equated judges legislating
from the bench with abortion.275  Today, when a Republican presi-
dent’s nominee or a Republican senator makes these claims, they
are heard by the President’s supporters as one in-group member to
another in-group member.
At the same time, however, because such claims are couched in
the language of neutrality and lack of bias, because no one believes
that judges or Justices should decide cases based on who they like
better or because they have a political agenda they want to imple-
ment, because no one believes that judges or Justices are legislators,
all nominees and many senators find themselves using some of the
same or similar words.  But when Democratic nominees use this
language, they may set up the dynamic Kahan and his co-authors
describe, so that the cognitive dissonance of the claimed neutrality
with the observed ideological influences contribute to the neutrality
crisis.  Put another way, for some, conservative approaches to Su-
preme Court decision-making are defined as “neutral,” meaning
that less conservative approaches are, by definition, not neutral.276
274. Epstein, Segal, & Westlander, supra note 49, at 611-12 (describing Presi-
dent Nixon’s ideological concerns when nominating William Rehnquist) (citing
John W. Dean, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 16 (2001) (quoting memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to Attorney General John N.
Mitchell (May 29, 1969))). See also Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 251
(describing the “Reagan revolution,” with respect to law, as “a belief that we
should interpret the Constitution according to its terms, that judges don’t shape
policy, that judges interpret the law, and that legislators shape policy”). Senator
John Cornyn stated:
Judges are not in the business of picking winners and losers before they
have actually heard the case, of course.  I mean that is fundamental to our
concept of justice, that a judge be openminded, be willing to listen to the
facts and arguments of counsel, and then make a decision.  And the pro-
cess that you use is by applying neutral principles.
Id. at 269 (statement of John Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. On the Judiciary).
275. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 289.
276. Cf. David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Back-
lash?: Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 777-78
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And this association of neutrality with a conservative ideology is
evidenced by the fact that Democratic nominees are nearly twice as
likely as Republican nominees to acknowledge that judgment or
discretion can play a role in the work of the Supreme Court when
they are in colloquy with any particular senator.277
This dynamic is not limited to confirmation hearings, of course.
Consider, for example, one of the presidential debates during the
2004 presidential campaign.  When asked about Supreme Court
nominations, George Bush promised to seek “strict construction-
ists” who would not impose “personal opinion” on the Constitution
as happened, he said, in Dred Scott.278  To many on the left, this
discussion was, in the words of one commentator, “baffl[ing].”279
Just as Brown is universally hailed as correctly decided, Dred Scott
v. Sandford,280 which held that African-Americans were not full cit-
izens, is universally understood to be one of the Supreme Court’s
greatest and most shameful mistakes.  No one, on either side of the
aisle, could or would disagree with a desire to reject it.  But some
people in the anti-abortion movement compare Dred Scott to
Roe.281  Thus, a promise that on its face anyone could agree with—
no decisions like Dred Scott—was understood by some listeners as
a promise to appoint pro-life Justices who would reject Roe.282
V. ACKNOWLEDGING JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
This state of affairs creates a bit of conundrum.  Contemporary
nominees evade discussions of ideology and judicial philosophy,
making the discussions of judicial philosophy from the 1980s and
1990s a thing of the past.  Nominees, in various ways, continue to
pledge their neutrality and their respect for the rule of law, and
they disavow activism and the use of their personal beliefs or policy
preferences.  All of this is uncontroversial and uninformative.  The
(2012) (noting that Justices across the political spectrum “label[ ] their own ap-
proach fair and foolproof and the other approach biased and foolhardy,” describ-
ing their “view of the Court as obvious and neutral” and arguing that such
discussions only “hid[e] our bias rather than resolv[e] it”).
277. Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality, supra note 121, at 467.
278. See Timothy Noah, Why Bush Opposes Dred Scott, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2004,
6:45 PM), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2004/10/
why_bush_opposes_dred_scott.html.
279. See id.
280. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
281. See Noah, supra note 282 (citing references).
282. In fact, Senator Grassley and Chief Justice Roberts had such a colloquy.
Grassley used Dred Scott as a way to explore whether Roberts would be willing to
overrule clearly erroneous and overreaching constitutional precedents. Roberts
Hearing, supra note 12, at 179-81.
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senators cannot effectively shift the nominees’ incentives to pro-
mote more disclosure.  And yet, despite those who would argue for
hearings focused only on ethics and qualifications, the Senate—and
many Americans more generally—want to know more about what
kind of Justice a nominee will make.
The senators, however frustrated they may be with nominees’
testimony, do have an important tool at their disposal:  what they
themselves say.  Thinking about how to use this tool effectively,
however, requires thinking about the confirmation hearings differ-
ently.  Obviously, one purpose of the hearings is for the senators to
vet and examine the President’s choice.  But that purpose does not
have to be the only one.
Senators can take advantage of the unusual public attention
focused on confirmation hearings to try to affect the national con-
versation about the Supreme Court.  Thus, instead of imposing bur-
dens of proof on the nominees, the senators should change the
focus of the questioning to at least some degree.  Specifically, they
should engage in discussions about why there are not necessarily
clear answers to important legal questions, focusing on the indeter-
minate nature of the issues that will face the nominee if he or she
becomes a Justice.283  Such matters can be explored by senators re-
gardless of who the President is and regardless of whether they are
inclined to support or oppose any particular nominee.  This line of
questioning would not be about imposing a particular burden of
proof on the nominee.  It would be, rather, an attempt to have a
more candid conversation about what the Court actually does.
Opportunities for this kind of discussion abound.  At Justice
Alito’s confirmation hearing, for example, Senator Leahy asked
him about two Fourth Amendment cases in which he, alone among
the judges on the two panels, believed that the police officers in-
volved should not be held liable for violating the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Both cases involved the question of whether the police had
exceeded the scope of a warrant, in one case by strip searching a
minor and her mother,284 neither of whom was a suspect, and in the
other by the treatment of witnesses on the premises when a search
warrant was executed.285  In both cases, Judge Alito would have
held that the police were justified in their actions—or at least could
have reasonably believed that they were, entitling them to qualified
283. Fontana & Braman, supra note 280, at 780 (arguing that “[r]ecognizing
ambiguity causes people to confront it and confront the biases they use to resolve
ambiguity”).
284. See generally Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
285. See generally Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995).
646 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:585
immunity.  In both cases, the other two judges on the panel dis-
agreed.  (Of the four judges that Alito sat with in these two cases,
three were appointed by Republican presidents.)286  Leahy ex-
plained that he was concerned about these cases because in them,
Alito
settled all issues in a light most favorable . . . to law enforcement
. . . And I worry about this because I always worry that the courts
must be there to protect individuals against an overreaching gov-
ernment.  In this case [sic], your position in the minority was that
you protected what the majority felt was an overreaching
government.287
In explaining his votes, Judge Alito said:  “Now Judge Chertoff
looked at it differently and there are cases where reasonable people
disagree, and that is all that was going on.”288  After that exchange,
Senator Leahy moved on to another subject.
It is highly unlikely, of course, that the types of questions that
Senator Leahy was asking would have provoked any illuminating
responses, even if he had continued the exchange.  Surely, Judge
Alito was not going to say that he did not want to protect individu-
als against an overreaching government.  Nor would any specific ex-
planation of his votes in those cases have been more illuminating
than his written opinions.
Much more interesting than a discussion of why Alito voted
the way he did in those particular cases, however, would have been
a discussion of why reasonable people could disagree about them.
What is it about the legal question presented to the Third Circuit in
those cases that allowed for that kind of disagreement?  Does Alito
expect even more such cases at the Supreme Court—cases in which
reasonable people can disagree?  What factors does he take into
account when reaching a conclusion in such a case?  Such a discus-
sion might help give lie to claims that judging, especially on the
Supreme Court, is like neutral umpiring.289
286. The judges were Judge Michael Chertoff, appointed to the Third Circuit
by President George W. Bush, Judge John R. Gibson, appointed to the Eighth
Circuit (and sitting by designation) by President Ronald Reagan, and Judge Ed-
ward R. Becker, appointed to the district court by President Richard Nixon and to
the Third Circuit by President Reagan.  The lone Democratic appointee was Judge
Thomas Ambro, appointed by President Bill Clinton.
287. Alito Hearing, supra note 119, at 332.
288. Id.
289. Senator Biden did attempt to have such a discussion with Roberts, ex-
plicitly taking issue with the umpire metaphor and pointing out that with respect to
many issues, the Justices actually determine the strike zone and thus are not
merely calling balls or strikes. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 185-86.  But
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Chief Justice Roberts discussed another example of the need
for judgment in judging during his confirmation hearings.  Pressed
by Senator Kohl as to whether there are “intellectually honest ap-
proach[es]” on both sides of Roe v. Wade,290 then-Judge Roberts
conceded that “reasonable people can disagree about that decision
. . . .”291 A follow-up conversation about why reasonable people
might disagree about Roe might have led to a discussion of the exis-
tence of different understandings of equality and liberty.  Although
Roberts would likely have declined to state a position, acknowledg-
ment of these different perspectives could have a valuable effect on
public discourse.  Nor would this kind of discussion be limited to
the confirmation hearings themselves.
The confirmation hearings are a particularly valuable opportu-
nity, however, to affect the public discussion of the nature of the
Court’s work.  In part, the hearings carry this potential because so
many people pay special attention to them.  But in part, acknowl-
edging the important role of judicial philosophy and judgment sim-
ply has the benefit of being an accurate description of the work of
the Court.  Moreover, exploring this reality does not have to de-
pend on what the nominee says in response.  That is, although nom-
inees will undoubtedly seek the most non-controversial ways of
answering the questions asked, the tenor of the discussion might
nonetheless change.  For example, senators might ask nominees
what they think when their colleagues disagree with them, regard-
less of whether they are in the majority or the dissent.  Do they
consider those colleagues—or for that matter the district court
judges they sometimes reverse—lawless, results-oriented, activist?
If not, why not?  The likely answers to these questions (“no, my
colleagues are not lawless”) might themselves affect the public con-
versation about what judges and Justices do.  Finally, such discus-
sions might assist the senators—and the public—in evaluating the
extent to which the nominees are truly open-minded.  Do they rec-
ognize that different people might see the same set of facts differ-
ently, and how might that fact inform their jurisprudence?  And
again, the senators can initiate these conversations without making
any declarations about what they expect nominees to prove to earn
rather than press Roberts on the accuracy of the description, Biden spent most of
the rest of the colloquy trying, and failing, to get Roberts to talk about specific
cases and issues and comparing the candor of his answers to that of Justice Gins-
burg. Id. at 186–94.
290. Roberts Hearing, supra note 12, at 206.
291. Id.
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their votes and without expecting nominees to act counter to their
incentives.
CONCLUSION
No Supreme Court nominee will ever reveal what the senators
and citizenry most want to know.  (Will she vote to overrule Roe v.
Wade or Citizens United?  Would she have voted to uphold the Af-
fordable Care Act?)  And senators are constrained by significant
political forces that make them unlikely to impose meaningful bur-
dens of proof on nominees of their own party’s President.  But this
state of affairs does not mean that confirmation hearings are useless
or that nothing meaningful can emerge from them.  The remarkable
public focus on confirmation hearings gives senators an opportunity
to affect the public’s perception of the Supreme Court, perhaps to
the benefit of the Court’s own legitimacy.  Insisting on discussions
of the nature of the issues that the Supreme Court must decide
would provide a more realistic picture of the Court’s work to the
general public and would encourage nominees to talk more openly
about the role of judicial philosophy in the work of the Court.
